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Wednesday, 1 October 2008

What's TARP worth?

If TARP2 goes through (90% probable?) the US Fed and Treasury may (or may not) come clean on immediate gains to the public finances. There are very direct gains for the public purse and the banks, and generally in the markets. When the bailout was first mooted markets jumped 8%. What happens when TARP passes - maybe a 5-10% jump today (despite recession news)and more after Friday? The staggering of the decision may work well by frustrating the stock markets from rising too sharply too quickly, but there is also a risk that TARP loses some of its confidence-boosting effect.
I totally disagree with the privatising and socialising of gain and loss type 1-dimensional arguments. To repeat an earlier calculation, I expect the following minimum gains from TARP's $700bn and expect not all of the fund will be deployed this year.
Private sector, $650bn gain approx:
q $400bn gain to banks' troubled asset fair values
q $200bn capitalisation gain via banks' share prices
q $40bn avoided in 1% insurance hike on FDIC's $4tn deposits
Public sector, $530bn gain approx:
q $100bn avoided in 2% deposit insurance on insured mortgages
q $100bn 10% gain to AIG's $1tn assets (Federally owned)
q $ 85bn recovery of loan to AIG
q $160bn to bal. sheet of FM&FM $1.6tn assets/ $1.5tn liabilities
q $100bn 15% profit on RMBS etc. bought in by TARP
to which can be added other gains in tax, lower cost of borrowing etc.

Wholesale bank funding

The 160-200bp and above margin (overnight US$ LIBOR at 6.78%, highest since 2001) on interbank lending is explained by commentators as banks refusing to lend to each other directly and/or hoarding cash for fear of counterparty risk or simply because they are cash-flow constrained. If interbank lending has dried up, then what is LIBOR other than an illiquid market risk price? And if banks who are normally herd animals will not flock together and make a show of confidence in each other, how can confidence be won externally? Kenichi Ohmae in today's FT says banks are exhibiting wolf-pack syndrome, "good at attacking prey as a team, they turn on the weakest of their cohort should hunger prevail!"
One answer is that banks are trying to replenish their reserves. Swapping securities of any sort for treasuries is ideal, because treasuries are almost zero counterparty risk requiring almost no contingenct reserve and hence much better than lending to other banks (not least when it can cost over 6% to ensure a loan to a reputable bank).
The Central banks are therefore today the preferred lender of first resort and in response to the demand are pumping money into the banks from time to time, not smoothly or regularly; like turning over an unresponsive engine when actually the plugs need cleaning and refuse to spark. One might be forgiven for thinking that in a liquidity crisis banks could recognise a mutual self-interest in simply resuming lending to each other at near to normal rates, and that their industry associations or the central bank should get them together and order them to agree to do so directly rather than indirectly via the central bank. After all, in the words of Martin Wolf (FT today) "we are witnessing the disintegration of the financial system". he also picked up one of my observations that some US conservatives are seeking a replay of the Great Depression without this time a New Deal. Is it that banks won't lend enough, or that they can't lend enough? One view is that banks have become deeply distrustful of each other, and have gambled away their most important asset: trust in each other. Another view is that strong banks are squeezing weaker ones and looking to buy them cheap. The central banks and the banking associations should surely at least be able to re-establish that trust if only at the level of short term interbank lending and borrowing. Instead they are trying to do it less directly via market mechanisms, a clearing and transparant swap system for 'troubled assets' (e.g. TARP), by adding flexibility to fair value pricing, and in extreme instances by forcing mergers or taking equity stakes. A further more drastic measure being considered is to force the break-up of different parts of large bank groups - funds management, proprietary trading, traditional banking, insurance, complex structured products and to bring OTC markets on-exchange, such as proposed by Prof. Tim Congdon and others.
This is being resisted by the likes of the ISDA who hope that creating clearing houses for OTC trading will suffice to net off credit derivatives and provide transparancy. Goldman, Deutsche and JPM are hoping to launch such a clearing house in November. Gerald Corrigan, MD of Goldmans and ex-President of the NY Fed, and Chair of several regulatory iniatives places much hope in CMPG III Report's new methodology for execution of close-out against a CDS defaulted counterparty, which has already netted $14tn off the $30tn book at the Depository Trust Company between April and August. Bank of America analysts estimate that liquidity measures by central banks will add nearly $500bn to banks' capital reserves in the coming weeks rising to $630bn around year end when bank borrowing demand is high.
The engine of the money market is banks borrowing and lending to each other, using CP, repos and similar instruments, benchmarked (i.e. priced over and above) to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Today, there is interbank borrowing and lending, but it is almost all via the central bank. Banks are hoarding cash at the central bank, buying treasuries and borrowing from the central bank, which is acting like an exchange, not just as the manager of the money supply (accepting securities as collateral for loans, or buying the securities for money). The liquidity infusions by central banks appear to taxpayers to be diverting their hard-earned tax into aid for banks and away from more deserving spending programmes, and has also been characterized as not unlike giving prescription methadone to heroin addicts, although in fact this is mistaken; the money is not free, not something for nothing.
In Germany there is no sign of a credit crunch according to the country's BdB private banks' association on 18 Sept. One reason given is the memory of 1931 when a Berlin bank's failure crashed the system. The German Foreign Minister has said Germany has no need of TARP. Hank Paulson has asked that other countries set up their own TARPs. The The EU Commission welcomed the bailout plan when it was announced but said that creating a TARP for the EU (or by the ECB for the Eurozone)
"not a question that falls directly under the Commission's competence." The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, reiterated calls for more transparency and tighter regulation of markets, and is very critical of the US for failing to heed calls to improve regulation of hedge funds and implement more stringent financial controls, Although several banks have failed and Germany did grant retail investors access AI hedge funds a few years ago, and some extended mm funds have failed and money market conditions were restored only by heavy borrowing from the ECB’s lending facility against collateral that is not viable in the capital markets, just as in the US, and the unsecured lending rate EURIBOR remains high, German politicians are nevertheless wary of TARP and have ruled out any participation.
Counterparty risk reflected in the interbank lending rate was tackled in Ireland by the decision to guarantee all deposits(400bn or more, equal to about twice GDP). This is having a ripple effect to other countries. Senior bankers in the UK are pressing the Government to guarantee in full more than £2tn of deposits (1.5 times GDP), protecting all UK bank depositors completely, saying that PM Brown's pledge to raise the cap on savings protected to £50,000 is not be enough to restore confidence (The Independent today).
It seems to me that banks in Europe should be getting together under some auspices such as their banking associations and hammer out agreements to ease liquidity constraints between them directly and even work on creating their own mini-TARPs.
see also: http://www.ft.com/cms/bfba2c48-5588-11dc-b971-0000779fd2ac.html

FAIR VALUE?

Commentators are somewhat confused about "Fair Value" accounting. Some think it only means marking-to-market (MtM). The general definition is the price that is most likely to be agreed between a willing seller and a willing buyer in an open liquid market between unrelated parties. In disorderly, abnormal, turbulent or illiquid markets i.e. a severely one-way bet buyer's or a seller's market, then holders of the assets may deem them not for sale ("for holding to maturity", or not available currently for imminent sale etc.) and create a longer term valuation (fair value). The global accounting body behind IAS, now IFRS, the AIBD (The International Accounting Standards Board founded on April Fool's Day, 2001) has issued standards in recent years that provide flexibility in fair value, but Dr Tweedie, its President, insists vehemently in the absolute necessity to MtM wherever possible. Banks have used a fusion of MtM and long run, even cyclical, fair value estimates, sometimes including aspects of VaR, historical and NPV and other cross-correlations, and then called the writedown "an adjustement for market turbulence." The AIBD fear that this complexity gives too much scope for gaming. Now, the SEC has stepped in with concessions to securities traders and investment funds, prime brokers and hedge funds.
Yesterday, the SEC reprieved them from marking hard-to-value assets down to fire sale prices, following SEC Chairman Christopher Cox and a bipartisan group of more than 60 U.S. legislators who urged the SEC to suspend the fair value accounting rule immediately - and stock markets rose on the news. Valuation problems lie at the heart of the credit crunch crisis, and that this move may slow or reverse announcements of mortgage-related losses on banks' balance sheets. Basically, the SEC states that firms need not use fire-sale prices when evaluating illiquid assets, that "distressed or forced liquidation sales are not orderly transactions." The U.S. accounting standards body, the FASB said it would change the agenda for its Wednesday meeting to focus on fair value accounting and issue further guidance same day! Yesterday was the last day of Q3 for most U.S. companies, allowing them to incorporate the changes in their quarterly statements. Management's internal model assumptions can be used to measure fair value when relevant or reliable market prices do not exist. The American Bankers Association had been among several bodies pressing the SEC to clarify the rules for months.
The fact is, however, that complex mortgage securities until a year ago traded in one-way markets, and liquid secondary cash markets never took off despite the $trillions involved! The difficulty or reluctance to flip (sell-on) ABS, RMBS etc. and simply to use them as high grade collateral spurred on a massive credit derivatives OTC market that created 10-20 layers of insurance and hedging cover of the underlying, much of which is short term and will unravel during this month. Critics have complained that accountants forced banks to base their values on fire-sale prices in illiquid markets instead of the so-called level 3 input (for illiquid assets and unobservable factors, using various internal risk pricing estimation models). But until Basel II is fully implemented such black box models cannot be strictly supervised.
This move will bring relief to Hedge Funds after a bad year and rumours of investors withdrawing funds, though at the same time may frustrate vulture hedge funds looking to buy at fire-sale prices. There are warnings afoot about this. Reuters reports Chris Whalen, co-founder of Institutional Risk Analytics, saying "Fair value accounting is a utopian dream that ran into the reality of business and litigation," and "Equating an opinion with a market price is crazy," and "It doesn't matter who gives the opinion -- the auditor is still going to say to the client, 'Why don't you write it down?'"
Note: accounting rules define a "Level 1" asset as MtM based on a simple price quote in an active market. "Level 2" assets are "mark-to-model" s estimated based on observable market prices plus other data inputs. A "Level 3" asset is so illiquid its value is based only on management's best estimate derived from complex internal models.

Irish American solution?

The FT reports that the Irish government’s emergency move has enraged British and European officials and may fall foul of the European Commission’s rules on state aid by offering competitive advantages to some Irish banks. This sounds absurd in view of the state aid by 6 EU states (including to Fortis and Dexia, Northern Rock, B&B) and variously many others via the central banks' lqiquidity injections etc. The European Commission said it was looking to see whether state aid was involved, which may invite the usual questions about bears in woods etc. except that depositor guarantees do require the deposit-takers to pay part or all of this insurance cost! In the UK, PM Brown indicated readiness to consider increasing savers’ deposits guarantees from £35,000 to £50,000 but not want until the markets had calmed down - why that? Mervyn King, Bank of England governor, it is claimed would resist this, because any guarantees would represent too much moral hazard - another absurdity in current circumstances and given that these guarantees are not permanent. Jim Stride, MD Axa investment managers UK, said UK should “consider the introduction of a full guarantee for UK deposits with duly authorised deposit taking companies along the lines announced by the Irish authorities”, to which he might have added the new US plan, TARP 2, given that both US presidential candidates called for an increase in the guarantees to savers, from $100,000 to $250,000, so that surely is bound to happen? Alistair Darling, the UK Chancellor (Finance Minister) held a conference call with the CEOs of the UK’s largest banks to discuss responses to the crisis, and probably they decided to wait for the US senate vote and its impact on the markets?
Read David McWilliams on Ireland's move: http://www.davidmcwilliams.ie/2008/10/01/lenihans-masterstroke-has-bought-us-time-to-sort-out-our-own-problems

TARP 2

Equity markets and banks' shares are up - expecting the US Senate to vote for TARP 2 - expecting the US House of Representatives to follow suit on Thursday. There is Ireland leading the way (guaranteeing all bank deposits and bondholders) putting pressure on the UK and others, and may also have influenced the US Senate in TARP 2 to increase all US retail depositor savings protection up to $250,000. The FT also report a global gold rush. Meanwhile the BBC morning news had Prof. Talib of NYU risk engineering on to say that the TARP bailout is wrong because it socialises the losses and privatises the gains, which I thoroughly disagree with. But, Talib has a particular perspective in part coming from having been a derivatives (proprietary and arbitrage) trader. He argues that our risk systems and analyses fail to understand chance, and worse that risk regulation created more systemic risk and basic risk diversification was discounted, and further, he simply castigates the generality of risk management and regulation as rubbish, worse than useless, in fact dangerous for being misleading and creating a false sense of security.
Prof. Talib is a self-promoter in the media and his books, and his populist views - TARP is wrong and all of banks' risk practises are rubbish - have political weight of some influence. He is saying that banks rationalise chance events ex-post and actually have no valid ex-ante explanations (or predicters) for extreme risk events?
I think his perspective may be mired in maths engineering culture of trading room, inter-day risks (not in that of cyclical financial economics), and it is too easy to cite the scale of the 2007-09 credit crunch (and earlier systemic crises as recent as in the 1980s and '90s) to totally condemn financial risk theories and regulatory systems.

Tuesday, 30 September 2008

Some lightening














Buy on historical bottoms, any such excuse, and sell on anything else, or Graham, Templeton, and Buffet's buy on fact and sell on rumour ? All sounds like a predominantly see-saw ratchet continuing this week profit-taking on the ups or downs (oops) - a game for insider professionals only. The FTSE100 in September has fallen further (-13%)than for any month since October 1987 (other markets similarly - some commentators estimate $18tn in lost equity values globally over the past year?). It is 25% down on the year, 16% down over 2yrs, and roughly 25% up over 5yrs - so technically most probably a good time to buy. Except for the unravelling expected this month of much of the $54tn in CDS outstanding, we may have a White October following a Black September.
A number of Asian equity markets recovered this morning after financial stocks were boosted by hopes of an emergency rate cut from the Federal Reserve after US government efforts to bail out the US financial system were blocked, but will be revived. Irish banks staged a dramatic rally today after Ireland's government said it would guarantee all deposits and bank debt for two years, following the previous session's record losses in which Ireland's stocks slid to their lowest level in 10years (see earlier blog). London equities rose as investors began to bet that indices have reached their nadir turning point after the first attempt failure of the TARP bad bank bail-out. Trade in bank stocks remain uncertain. Wachovia was sold to Citi very cheaply excpet for Citi's $49bn provision against potential losses when it unwinds Wachovia's balance sheet. Lloyds TSB was higher but merger partner HBOS fell again, but their merger remains more on than off. Eurozone inflation is on a downward trend (if oil resumes a long run fall), but not enough to change the view that ECB will keep its main interest rate on hold, with a first cut not expected before December. The dollar advanced against the euro and the yen again as US investors actually repatriated funds following the failure of the US government to pass TARP. US stocks opened higher after a brutal sell-off during the previous session, on hopes that Washington would revive a plan to rescue the financial sector from collapse. This should mean oil price going down, but oil staged a rebound after a sharp fall in the previous session while gold lingered at the $900 level after US equities tumbled yesterday following TARP's rejection by Congress.

HERE’S MY EXCHANGE PLAN*

A week ago I wrote about an Exchange-bsed solution to take OTC structured products that are illiquid and toxic on-exchange (writing here and in FT Economists Forum and to some influencers in the US to take fuller advantage of TARP on top of the Fed's and Treasury's admin takeover of Freddie, Fannie, and AIG, and the reduction of CDS that is going on as firms merge and eliminated exposures to each other - part of the M&A/takeover price, including Citi AND Wachovia or JPM and Bear). I expand below on the original idea:
1. Establish a regulated EXCHANGE (owned by the Fed & US Treasury, with possibly BoE and ECB, and operated by the CME/CBOT/CBOE or equivalent) to trade structured products transparently (with protocols for tradability of commoditised asset backed products) based on cyclical (hold-to-maturity) economic cash-flow (IFRS-7) valuations plus tranche-based risk-hedging. Absolutely no trading would be allowed over-the-counter or otherwise on any of the eligible-securities specific pricing models or indexes. Products must be easily valued and rated on an exchange using for MBS sovereign ratings models to reflect national economy variations in mortgage protection and borrowers’ rights. Create a class of "eligible (mortgage-related only) securities" that are ‘toxic’, leaving all eligible securities on the books of existing holders. Central banks can buy in ABS (RMBS, CDOs etc.) or sell ABS holdings to maintain a target over the cycle price floor as per the TARP objective.
2. Have eligible security holders identify to the Exchange every eligible security by CUSIP and face amount. Only the Exchange will know institutional and investor positions. This will allow the Exchange internally to correctly assess the risks at hedge funds and others with "significant operations" without exposing their positions to competitors. Create a new accounting domain in-between "held-to-maturity" and "available-to-trade" where only eligible securities, as of a predetermined valuation date, can be accounted for at their value on the predetermined valuation date and not further subject to fair-value (marked-to-market) accounting while held for trading (something short of held to maturity).
2. Establish standard ratings on a "pooled-income revenue basis," whereby all issuers and holders that want (or are required) to be rated, pool funds on a per-volume, pro-rata basis and ratings providers are paid blindly for rating services.
3. Immediately stop issuance of CDS (credit default swaps) without mandatory reserve requirements and safeguards typical of what regulations already require of legitimate (Solvency II regulated) insurers. Netting of all existing CDS to tighten counterparty risk and unwind positions not secured by issuers meeting reserve requirements, and to eliminate virtual insurers. Allow issuance of CDS only up to the actual outstanding value of the underlying to ensure legitimate hedging only (eliminating undue pressure on debt issuers).
4. Mandate all holders of eligible securities mark-to-market inventories on a predetermined valuation date, the date that the Exchange expects all eligible securities to be registered with it. Those who recently marked their securities have already taken write-downs; those who haven’t will have to. If the results match bona-fide peer-group comparisons, investors and speculators may bid up eligible securities to own them before the predetermined valuation date, using new accounting definition(IFRS-7) advantages for holding eligible securities.
5. Reduce the haircut on the reserve requirements for all eligible securities covered. Since valuations have already fallen steeply, reducing reserve requirements on eligible securities additionally enhances their value as balance-sheet assets with upside potential. The Exchange may buy distressed assets at the behest of the Fed, Treasury (FDIC), or other authorities who have determined an administration outcome for holders suffering insolvency as a result of accurate mark-to-market values whereby their holdings on the predetermined valuation date (in the event of bankruptcy) may result in systemic problems. This scenario would meet TARP objectives of preventing exposing the financial system to disruptions.
6. The Exchange (backed by central financial authorities) will have a firm quality of market handle on all eligible securities and a transparent-pricing process through which any and all eligible securities may be accepted as collateral against Fed and other central bank discount windows and/or dealer and swap facilities.
7. "Servicers," (usually the originators) who manage the underlying asset pools (mortgage books etc.) on behalf of conduits (trust entities) under which securitised pools are issued, must be empowered to alter and modify terms and conditions of underlying mortgages as (or in conjunction with) the originating banks or lending institutions on the same risk mitigating (prudential + customer service) basis as their on balance sheet books with actions reported to and by the Exchange (and/or secured by first loss contracts) to incentivise banks and lending institutions to modify existing mortgages and to incentivize homeowners to stay in homes with negative equity or high LtV, taxing all capital gains on appreciation of newly appraised homes if and when they are sold by either homeowners, banks or lending institutions. And create tax-advantage scenarios for banks and homeowners partnering in the orderly reduction of delinquent obligations whenever loans can be brought back into a performing status. Lenders have various techniques for minimizing delinquency such as mortgage payment holidays, equity release and insurance cover (including Federal or other equivalents).
* with inspiration from R. Shah Gilani (trader, earlymorning.com 29 Sept), Ronald P. O’Hanley, Vice Chairman, The Bank of New York Mellon and Charles. J. Jacklin, PhD, President and CEO, Mellon Capital Management (FT 26 Sept.) and Prof. Gilad Livne, and Prof. Alistair Milne at Cass Business School, City University London (FT 24 Sept.), and others writing in the FT mainly.