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Thursday, 2 October 2008

HEDGE BACKWARDS


An increasing number of hedge funds are telling customers they cannot have their money back just now (though not a new practise) as rising withdrawals on top of problems in getting collateral back from prime brokerages’ rehypothecations (such as most notably at Lehman Brothers), plus talk of the past year being especially bad for hedge funds’ performance – are all supposedly hitting retail and institutional confidence in hedge funds. Hedge fund performance at minus 10% is described as “shocking!”, but as many have done better than that as have done worse than that.
There are at least 3 thousand relatively reputable hedge funds. They are not a homogeneous instrument or asset class that performs as one. When the stock market has fallen 25% and given the enormous sensitivity of hedge funds because of their ultra-high leveraging, and their liquidity mix of long and short term funds, -10%. measured at the point of maximum pessimism or market floor, is really a good performance! But, it is only the aggregate across the industry. Many funds have performed much worse. The fear is that hedge fund liquidations that could surpass 2005, when roughly 10% of Hedges closed. Leverage is harder to get, limiting absolute returns (losses or profits), though 20-25% of hedge fund assets appear to be in cash and treasuries just now anyway.
Institutional investors in hedge funds have their own clients’ anxieties and any losses kill performance fees. Losses can invite liquidation if managers reckon the road back to previous high water marks (carryforward provisions and hurdle rates) before they can charge performance fees is too hard or too long. For HNWs and other investors able to take a longer view, then hedge funds may well be considered a great place to be to buy distressed assets at fire-sale prices, especially financial assets that may soon become more standardised, commoditised, easier to net clear and credit-worthy again. Not so, however, if the roll-over leveraging by which hedge funds counter-intuitively stake-out volatile markets looking for spectacular short to medium term gains. Macro-funds have outperformed others – they do not just analyze the technical market risk indicators but base their strategy on macro-economic risk drivers and think about cycles.
Anyone not wanting to be invested in an underperforming hedge fund right now can normally withdraw on the first day of any quarter? It may be that in exchange for refusing to permit investors to withdraw hedge funds have ensured that investors funds are placed in safe money amrket funds. The hedge fund industry is variously said to have $2tn or $3tn under management. There may be a total of 56,000 funds (19,800 “distinct” hedge fund and fund of funds of which 15,400 report performance, and 13,675 single manager funds of which 10,200 reported, and 6,100 funds of funds). 40% of these are less than 3 years old. 90% of closures tend to be single-manager funds and the attrition among new funds is bound to be high, maybe 60%, which is typical of all new start-ups. Note that of single manager funds, two thirds are domiciled off-shore. Therefore, the estimate that 2,000 hedge funds and 500 hedge funds of funds may be at death’s door is not fanciful, although less than 200 have gone in Q1-Q3 of 2008.
I doubt that a wave of clients requesting their money back as predicted over the next 6 months will pull down aset prices simply because in today’s volatile markets 6 months is a very long time. Also, the range has never been wider between good and bad performing funds. Therefore, investors may shift from fund to fund more that withdraw entirely from hedge fund investments, though not necessarily from small to large given that power to leverage and short-selling are not the basis for performance that it was before August 2007. A sign of this may have been Lehman Bros selling Neuberger Berman for $2.15bn when its book and peer value was $8bn. People involved described the process of persuading them to sign on to the deal as akin to "herding cats."
A hedge fund shake out will, I suggest, not be brutal, if as before 90% of closures are single manager funds. We might know more about the systemic risk of hedge fund closures if the industry was regulated. In the UK, the FSA regulates hedge fund but not regulate the funds themselves (despite as win most major countries these are open to retail investors). The FSA has long promised some thematic work on the adequacy of systems and controls in hedge fund managers, but may be waiting to see what the SEC does. The FSA said, "We do not and cannot regulate the hedge funds themselves or set standards for them to achieve. However, all firms based in London, including the hedge fund managers, must take reasonable care to maintain systems and controls appropriate to their business. Hedge fund managers should be properly qualified and controlled when undertaking investment activities for their client fund. Any hedge fund manager in breach of these standards would be in breach of the rules." The rules are basically the same for any investment intermediaries, advisors and brokers.
SEC chairman Christopher Cox has sought more regulatory supervision, but been overturned in federal court in June 2006. Concerns have been voiced by all and sundry, including a few hedge funds, and not least in Europe, such as Angela Merkel no less, about the lack of transparency as well as inordinate fast growth of hedge funds. Under the SEC's proposals of 2004, hedge funds would have to register and open their books to the SEC. Mr Cox told the Senate Banking Committee that without regulation "the potential for retail investors to be harmed by hedge fund risk" (is a serious concern), and "the growth in hedge fund fraud that we have seen accompany the growth in hedge funds implicates the very basic responsibility of the SEC to protect investors from fraud, unfair dealing and market manipulation…;" "These are not investments for Mom and Pop." Currently, investors must have assets worth at least $1m, but Cox wanted this upped to $1.5m. Since then hedge fund assets grew fivefold. But, while at that time Mr Cox's demands were not supported by all other SEC commissioners, or by the Fed’s Ben Bernanke (who opted for free market discipline in place of constricting rules), it must now be easy to get SEC regulatory oversight passed.
Ten days ago EU lawmakers were set to adopt a report calling on EU Internal Market Commissioner, Charlie McCreevy, to come forward with a legislative proposal to toughen oversight of hedge funds and private equity companies. But, in prepared remarks to the European Parliament, McCreevy, said, "I don't believe it is necessary at this stage to tar hedge funds and private equity with the same brush as we use for the regulated sector." This surprising statement implies a backwards or relativist view of the virtues of regulation?

Fed X

In response to questions about where I get the $400bn+$600bn liquidity boosts coming, the answer is that the Fed will:
- boost 84-day cash loans available to U.S. banks to $75bn (up from current $25bn) starting on Oct. 6. Banks bid at auction for slices of the loans (tripling outstanding supply of 84-day loans to $225bn from $75bn).
- continue to make $75bn of shorter, 28-day loans available.
- make a total of $620bn available to other central banks (expanding currency "swaps" where dollars are exchanged for foreign currency (up from $290bn previously).
Bank of Canada, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, European Central Bank, Swiss National Bank and central banks of Denmark, Norway, Australia and Sweden are in the swap arrangements.

Wednesday, 1 October 2008

What's TARP worth?

If TARP2 goes through (90% probable?) the US Fed and Treasury may (or may not) come clean on immediate gains to the public finances. There are very direct gains for the public purse and the banks, and generally in the markets. When the bailout was first mooted markets jumped 8%. What happens when TARP passes - maybe a 5-10% jump today (despite recession news)and more after Friday? The staggering of the decision may work well by frustrating the stock markets from rising too sharply too quickly, but there is also a risk that TARP loses some of its confidence-boosting effect.
I totally disagree with the privatising and socialising of gain and loss type 1-dimensional arguments. To repeat an earlier calculation, I expect the following minimum gains from TARP's $700bn and expect not all of the fund will be deployed this year.
Private sector, $650bn gain approx:
q $400bn gain to banks' troubled asset fair values
q $200bn capitalisation gain via banks' share prices
q $40bn avoided in 1% insurance hike on FDIC's $4tn deposits
Public sector, $530bn gain approx:
q $100bn avoided in 2% deposit insurance on insured mortgages
q $100bn 10% gain to AIG's $1tn assets (Federally owned)
q $ 85bn recovery of loan to AIG
q $160bn to bal. sheet of FM&FM $1.6tn assets/ $1.5tn liabilities
q $100bn 15% profit on RMBS etc. bought in by TARP
to which can be added other gains in tax, lower cost of borrowing etc.

Wholesale bank funding

The 160-200bp and above margin (overnight US$ LIBOR at 6.78%, highest since 2001) on interbank lending is explained by commentators as banks refusing to lend to each other directly and/or hoarding cash for fear of counterparty risk or simply because they are cash-flow constrained. If interbank lending has dried up, then what is LIBOR other than an illiquid market risk price? And if banks who are normally herd animals will not flock together and make a show of confidence in each other, how can confidence be won externally? Kenichi Ohmae in today's FT says banks are exhibiting wolf-pack syndrome, "good at attacking prey as a team, they turn on the weakest of their cohort should hunger prevail!"
One answer is that banks are trying to replenish their reserves. Swapping securities of any sort for treasuries is ideal, because treasuries are almost zero counterparty risk requiring almost no contingenct reserve and hence much better than lending to other banks (not least when it can cost over 6% to ensure a loan to a reputable bank).
The Central banks are therefore today the preferred lender of first resort and in response to the demand are pumping money into the banks from time to time, not smoothly or regularly; like turning over an unresponsive engine when actually the plugs need cleaning and refuse to spark. One might be forgiven for thinking that in a liquidity crisis banks could recognise a mutual self-interest in simply resuming lending to each other at near to normal rates, and that their industry associations or the central bank should get them together and order them to agree to do so directly rather than indirectly via the central bank. After all, in the words of Martin Wolf (FT today) "we are witnessing the disintegration of the financial system". he also picked up one of my observations that some US conservatives are seeking a replay of the Great Depression without this time a New Deal. Is it that banks won't lend enough, or that they can't lend enough? One view is that banks have become deeply distrustful of each other, and have gambled away their most important asset: trust in each other. Another view is that strong banks are squeezing weaker ones and looking to buy them cheap. The central banks and the banking associations should surely at least be able to re-establish that trust if only at the level of short term interbank lending and borrowing. Instead they are trying to do it less directly via market mechanisms, a clearing and transparant swap system for 'troubled assets' (e.g. TARP), by adding flexibility to fair value pricing, and in extreme instances by forcing mergers or taking equity stakes. A further more drastic measure being considered is to force the break-up of different parts of large bank groups - funds management, proprietary trading, traditional banking, insurance, complex structured products and to bring OTC markets on-exchange, such as proposed by Prof. Tim Congdon and others.
This is being resisted by the likes of the ISDA who hope that creating clearing houses for OTC trading will suffice to net off credit derivatives and provide transparancy. Goldman, Deutsche and JPM are hoping to launch such a clearing house in November. Gerald Corrigan, MD of Goldmans and ex-President of the NY Fed, and Chair of several regulatory iniatives places much hope in CMPG III Report's new methodology for execution of close-out against a CDS defaulted counterparty, which has already netted $14tn off the $30tn book at the Depository Trust Company between April and August. Bank of America analysts estimate that liquidity measures by central banks will add nearly $500bn to banks' capital reserves in the coming weeks rising to $630bn around year end when bank borrowing demand is high.
The engine of the money market is banks borrowing and lending to each other, using CP, repos and similar instruments, benchmarked (i.e. priced over and above) to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Today, there is interbank borrowing and lending, but it is almost all via the central bank. Banks are hoarding cash at the central bank, buying treasuries and borrowing from the central bank, which is acting like an exchange, not just as the manager of the money supply (accepting securities as collateral for loans, or buying the securities for money). The liquidity infusions by central banks appear to taxpayers to be diverting their hard-earned tax into aid for banks and away from more deserving spending programmes, and has also been characterized as not unlike giving prescription methadone to heroin addicts, although in fact this is mistaken; the money is not free, not something for nothing.
In Germany there is no sign of a credit crunch according to the country's BdB private banks' association on 18 Sept. One reason given is the memory of 1931 when a Berlin bank's failure crashed the system. The German Foreign Minister has said Germany has no need of TARP. Hank Paulson has asked that other countries set up their own TARPs. The The EU Commission welcomed the bailout plan when it was announced but said that creating a TARP for the EU (or by the ECB for the Eurozone)
"not a question that falls directly under the Commission's competence." The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, reiterated calls for more transparency and tighter regulation of markets, and is very critical of the US for failing to heed calls to improve regulation of hedge funds and implement more stringent financial controls, Although several banks have failed and Germany did grant retail investors access AI hedge funds a few years ago, and some extended mm funds have failed and money market conditions were restored only by heavy borrowing from the ECB’s lending facility against collateral that is not viable in the capital markets, just as in the US, and the unsecured lending rate EURIBOR remains high, German politicians are nevertheless wary of TARP and have ruled out any participation.
Counterparty risk reflected in the interbank lending rate was tackled in Ireland by the decision to guarantee all deposits(400bn or more, equal to about twice GDP). This is having a ripple effect to other countries. Senior bankers in the UK are pressing the Government to guarantee in full more than £2tn of deposits (1.5 times GDP), protecting all UK bank depositors completely, saying that PM Brown's pledge to raise the cap on savings protected to £50,000 is not be enough to restore confidence (The Independent today).
It seems to me that banks in Europe should be getting together under some auspices such as their banking associations and hammer out agreements to ease liquidity constraints between them directly and even work on creating their own mini-TARPs.
see also: http://www.ft.com/cms/bfba2c48-5588-11dc-b971-0000779fd2ac.html

FAIR VALUE?

Commentators are somewhat confused about "Fair Value" accounting. Some think it only means marking-to-market (MtM). The general definition is the price that is most likely to be agreed between a willing seller and a willing buyer in an open liquid market between unrelated parties. In disorderly, abnormal, turbulent or illiquid markets i.e. a severely one-way bet buyer's or a seller's market, then holders of the assets may deem them not for sale ("for holding to maturity", or not available currently for imminent sale etc.) and create a longer term valuation (fair value). The global accounting body behind IAS, now IFRS, the AIBD (The International Accounting Standards Board founded on April Fool's Day, 2001) has issued standards in recent years that provide flexibility in fair value, but Dr Tweedie, its President, insists vehemently in the absolute necessity to MtM wherever possible. Banks have used a fusion of MtM and long run, even cyclical, fair value estimates, sometimes including aspects of VaR, historical and NPV and other cross-correlations, and then called the writedown "an adjustement for market turbulence." The AIBD fear that this complexity gives too much scope for gaming. Now, the SEC has stepped in with concessions to securities traders and investment funds, prime brokers and hedge funds.
Yesterday, the SEC reprieved them from marking hard-to-value assets down to fire sale prices, following SEC Chairman Christopher Cox and a bipartisan group of more than 60 U.S. legislators who urged the SEC to suspend the fair value accounting rule immediately - and stock markets rose on the news. Valuation problems lie at the heart of the credit crunch crisis, and that this move may slow or reverse announcements of mortgage-related losses on banks' balance sheets. Basically, the SEC states that firms need not use fire-sale prices when evaluating illiquid assets, that "distressed or forced liquidation sales are not orderly transactions." The U.S. accounting standards body, the FASB said it would change the agenda for its Wednesday meeting to focus on fair value accounting and issue further guidance same day! Yesterday was the last day of Q3 for most U.S. companies, allowing them to incorporate the changes in their quarterly statements. Management's internal model assumptions can be used to measure fair value when relevant or reliable market prices do not exist. The American Bankers Association had been among several bodies pressing the SEC to clarify the rules for months.
The fact is, however, that complex mortgage securities until a year ago traded in one-way markets, and liquid secondary cash markets never took off despite the $trillions involved! The difficulty or reluctance to flip (sell-on) ABS, RMBS etc. and simply to use them as high grade collateral spurred on a massive credit derivatives OTC market that created 10-20 layers of insurance and hedging cover of the underlying, much of which is short term and will unravel during this month. Critics have complained that accountants forced banks to base their values on fire-sale prices in illiquid markets instead of the so-called level 3 input (for illiquid assets and unobservable factors, using various internal risk pricing estimation models). But until Basel II is fully implemented such black box models cannot be strictly supervised.
This move will bring relief to Hedge Funds after a bad year and rumours of investors withdrawing funds, though at the same time may frustrate vulture hedge funds looking to buy at fire-sale prices. There are warnings afoot about this. Reuters reports Chris Whalen, co-founder of Institutional Risk Analytics, saying "Fair value accounting is a utopian dream that ran into the reality of business and litigation," and "Equating an opinion with a market price is crazy," and "It doesn't matter who gives the opinion -- the auditor is still going to say to the client, 'Why don't you write it down?'"
Note: accounting rules define a "Level 1" asset as MtM based on a simple price quote in an active market. "Level 2" assets are "mark-to-model" s estimated based on observable market prices plus other data inputs. A "Level 3" asset is so illiquid its value is based only on management's best estimate derived from complex internal models.

Irish American solution?

The FT reports that the Irish government’s emergency move has enraged British and European officials and may fall foul of the European Commission’s rules on state aid by offering competitive advantages to some Irish banks. This sounds absurd in view of the state aid by 6 EU states (including to Fortis and Dexia, Northern Rock, B&B) and variously many others via the central banks' lqiquidity injections etc. The European Commission said it was looking to see whether state aid was involved, which may invite the usual questions about bears in woods etc. except that depositor guarantees do require the deposit-takers to pay part or all of this insurance cost! In the UK, PM Brown indicated readiness to consider increasing savers’ deposits guarantees from £35,000 to £50,000 but not want until the markets had calmed down - why that? Mervyn King, Bank of England governor, it is claimed would resist this, because any guarantees would represent too much moral hazard - another absurdity in current circumstances and given that these guarantees are not permanent. Jim Stride, MD Axa investment managers UK, said UK should “consider the introduction of a full guarantee for UK deposits with duly authorised deposit taking companies along the lines announced by the Irish authorities”, to which he might have added the new US plan, TARP 2, given that both US presidential candidates called for an increase in the guarantees to savers, from $100,000 to $250,000, so that surely is bound to happen? Alistair Darling, the UK Chancellor (Finance Minister) held a conference call with the CEOs of the UK’s largest banks to discuss responses to the crisis, and probably they decided to wait for the US senate vote and its impact on the markets?
Read David McWilliams on Ireland's move: http://www.davidmcwilliams.ie/2008/10/01/lenihans-masterstroke-has-bought-us-time-to-sort-out-our-own-problems

TARP 2

Equity markets and banks' shares are up - expecting the US Senate to vote for TARP 2 - expecting the US House of Representatives to follow suit on Thursday. There is Ireland leading the way (guaranteeing all bank deposits and bondholders) putting pressure on the UK and others, and may also have influenced the US Senate in TARP 2 to increase all US retail depositor savings protection up to $250,000. The FT also report a global gold rush. Meanwhile the BBC morning news had Prof. Talib of NYU risk engineering on to say that the TARP bailout is wrong because it socialises the losses and privatises the gains, which I thoroughly disagree with. But, Talib has a particular perspective in part coming from having been a derivatives (proprietary and arbitrage) trader. He argues that our risk systems and analyses fail to understand chance, and worse that risk regulation created more systemic risk and basic risk diversification was discounted, and further, he simply castigates the generality of risk management and regulation as rubbish, worse than useless, in fact dangerous for being misleading and creating a false sense of security.
Prof. Talib is a self-promoter in the media and his books, and his populist views - TARP is wrong and all of banks' risk practises are rubbish - have political weight of some influence. He is saying that banks rationalise chance events ex-post and actually have no valid ex-ante explanations (or predicters) for extreme risk events?
I think his perspective may be mired in maths engineering culture of trading room, inter-day risks (not in that of cyclical financial economics), and it is too easy to cite the scale of the 2007-09 credit crunch (and earlier systemic crises as recent as in the 1980s and '90s) to totally condemn financial risk theories and regulatory systems.