This site gets over 1,000 hits a week, and over 1,000 downloads of related papers by R.McDowell - an applied economist, wholesale, retail banking with 25+ years in banking, strategy, front office, trading book, banking book, core banking, audit, Head of Risk, PM roles & Basel II & Solv II Subject Matter Expert with 'Risk Dynamics' of Brussels.
Sunday, 5 October 2008
B2 or not B2?
Overnight Fortis Belgium has agrred to be taken over by Bank BNP Paribas! Fortis could not fully comply with Basel II reserve capital and economic capital requirements on the basis of its risk-adjusted accounts. Question marks remained about major gaps in the figures, gaps that were filled with not just fair value estimates, but gap estimates for missing numbers! Fortis, one of Europe's major banks, a "too big to fail" bank whose liabilities exceeded the GDP of the Benelux countries, was forced to sell 49% of its Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg businesses to the three respective governments. That seemed to be safe harbour, great news, bank saved. Then within days, if not hours, all of Fortis Netherlands (plus its share of ABN AMRO) including its original insurance business in the Netherlands is taken over 100% by the DNB (Dutch Central Bank and regulating supervisor)! What this means is that Fortis, whose branches are on every commercial street of Belgium and Holland, a bell-weather of the economies, politically economically key even to the great division betrween Flemish and Walloons threatening the political integrity of Belgium, can no longer do business with the Netherlands in the Netherlands; banking license cancelled; Fortis no longer on the authorised banking list! This is the first and perhaps most dramatic example of what happens when a bank cannot meet its requirements under the law (Basel II is the law); it becomes an ex-bank!
Agony Aunt
A CEO of a bank wrote in to ask me "Do you think the approved plan by congress is appropriate. It does recapitalise banks through high priced purchases of non performing debt?"
My instant reply was:
"As a bank CEO, you would have to be in respect of remuneration and reputation (after taking account of the moot balance of legal risks) suicidally desperate to go to TARP - your $millions in bonus-pay are docked or capped for both you and your star performers, plus the US Treasury (probably FDIC) can appoint an oversight board (will your board vote for that?) and the market then sees you as foolish or desperate or both and marks you down even before S&P, Moody's & Fitch drop your grade below AA- (the minimum for unsecured borrowing on the interbank money markets). You will get US treasuries (to put in your discredited capital reserve) as a swap for your toxic collateral - although at a few 100bp above current fire-sale prices - and now (on your trading and banking books) you also have to turn what had been a temporary discount for turbulence and internal mark-to-model fair value valuations into an economic loss i.e. you have advertised your bank to be an all-round basket case in intensive care (like Fortis or HypoReal or Wachovia), sucking at the teats of the Fed. And your stars and their teams, the high flying swinging rats, leave your sinking ship - now an M&A target for sure!
The Fed & UST only have full discretion over the first $250bn and I do not expect them to actually spend more than that. All this means that TARP may not operate as advertised on the packet. But, this is not to say the package won't work. It will. It is only required that TARP as lender of desperate last resort sets a new higher fire-sale price and because of the confidence injected into the equity and other markets. The Fed can use TARP to get back the $85bn loaned to AIG and can practise setting higher prices for toxic exposures on Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae balance sheets. The value of the benefits immediately redeemed thereby by the Fed, including shared riisk commitments with JPM/Bear Stearns and others (e.g. Citi if it has any chance in legally overturning the Wells Fargo/Wachovia deal), amounts to something north of $500bn. And I crudely estimate the benefits to banks' balance sheets generally of something north of $600bn.
It remains to be seen whether the European response of guaranteeing all major bank deposits (and bondholders) by Ireland, Greece and Germany (plus others in the coming days) and France's porposal of a €300bn EU-wide mini-TARP, turns out to be just as successful? On top of this is the conservative money markets swap windows operated by all central banks (mainly the Fed and BoE, but also ECB and Japan) worth over $1 trillion. If all these together do not right the sinking ship, and improve buoyancy, of the global financial system, then we have to conceive more elaborate detailed ideas, urgently, and these may this time include more sticks than carrots?"
My instant reply was:
"As a bank CEO, you would have to be in respect of remuneration and reputation (after taking account of the moot balance of legal risks) suicidally desperate to go to TARP - your $millions in bonus-pay are docked or capped for both you and your star performers, plus the US Treasury (probably FDIC) can appoint an oversight board (will your board vote for that?) and the market then sees you as foolish or desperate or both and marks you down even before S&P, Moody's & Fitch drop your grade below AA- (the minimum for unsecured borrowing on the interbank money markets). You will get US treasuries (to put in your discredited capital reserve) as a swap for your toxic collateral - although at a few 100bp above current fire-sale prices - and now (on your trading and banking books) you also have to turn what had been a temporary discount for turbulence and internal mark-to-model fair value valuations into an economic loss i.e. you have advertised your bank to be an all-round basket case in intensive care (like Fortis or HypoReal or Wachovia), sucking at the teats of the Fed. And your stars and their teams, the high flying swinging rats, leave your sinking ship - now an M&A target for sure!
The Fed & UST only have full discretion over the first $250bn and I do not expect them to actually spend more than that. All this means that TARP may not operate as advertised on the packet. But, this is not to say the package won't work. It will. It is only required that TARP as lender of desperate last resort sets a new higher fire-sale price and because of the confidence injected into the equity and other markets. The Fed can use TARP to get back the $85bn loaned to AIG and can practise setting higher prices for toxic exposures on Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae balance sheets. The value of the benefits immediately redeemed thereby by the Fed, including shared riisk commitments with JPM/Bear Stearns and others (e.g. Citi if it has any chance in legally overturning the Wells Fargo/Wachovia deal), amounts to something north of $500bn. And I crudely estimate the benefits to banks' balance sheets generally of something north of $600bn.
It remains to be seen whether the European response of guaranteeing all major bank deposits (and bondholders) by Ireland, Greece and Germany (plus others in the coming days) and France's porposal of a €300bn EU-wide mini-TARP, turns out to be just as successful? On top of this is the conservative money markets swap windows operated by all central banks (mainly the Fed and BoE, but also ECB and Japan) worth over $1 trillion. If all these together do not right the sinking ship, and improve buoyancy, of the global financial system, then we have to conceive more elaborate detailed ideas, urgently, and these may this time include more sticks than carrots?"
Friday, 3 October 2008
not so dramatic BoE
Just hours before TARP passed by 71 to 64 votes in the US Congress, the FT reported breathlessly, "The central bank announced a dramatic increase in its three-month lending to British banks, saying it was willing to offer cash against an even wider range of collateral!" and the The Chancellor states this as evidence of government doing all it can, all that is necessary...etc. But, all the bank is doing is expanding "eligible collateral... to include AAA rated asset-backed securities of some corporate and consumer loans; and approved highly-rated, asset-backed commercial paper programmes, where the underlying assets would be eligible if securitised".
This is only even a slight shift down in acceptable risk grades. In recent three-month auctions earlier this week, the Bank also accepted other countries’ government bonds, debt of US government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and AAA-rated tranches of prime European mortgages. That is not very wide - at worst the prices in the market are less than 10% down and this may be reflected in the bank's pricing? As of today (only until Nov. 18 subject to review on Oct.14) the class (but not the quality) of collateral is widened to include AAA-rated US securities backed by student, consumer and auto loans, senior tranches of US commercial mortgage-backed securities, US covered bonds, AAA-rated tranches of corporate bonds, and a wide range of other asset-backed commercial paper. Securitised student loans already carry a government underwriting guarantee. The others are all AAA too, although "a wide range of other CP" might include softer qualities, but generally the SLS (Special Liquidity Scheme) only seems to accept the highest rated paper. Yet, this dispensation carries a charge. "Given the further broadening of collateral, there will be a minimum bid rate of 50 basis points above the relevant overnight index swap (OIS) rate." An Overnight Index Swap (OIS) is an interest rate swap agreement where a fixed rate is swapped against a pre-determined published index of a daily overnight reference rate eg. SONIA (GBP) or EONIA (euro) for an agreed period. It is currently about 290 basis points, giving a price of 340bp not far off the very high TED spread of 380bp though slightly below 3 month dollar LIBOR at 433bp (and even higher in Europe at 533bp!), which represents a profound breakdown in interbank lending! Bankers are complaining that the billions of dollars of liquidity provided by central banks are not filtering into the loan market, which is paying punitive rates for euros, sterling and dollars in the overnight interbank market. What they are saying is that the Bank of England and others are not being as helpful as claimed. Mervyn King - Governor of the Bank of England - said today, "In these extraordinary market conditions, the Bank of England will take all actions necessary to ensure that the banking system has access to sufficient liquidity". Yes, liquidity, but not at rates that might help ease the liquidity squeeze. To ensure that it does not lend too cheaply, BoE insists that any bank willing to post some of the wider collateral may face a higher minimum bid in the auction (higher than those posting normal collateral). The minimum bid will be the three-month risk-free rate of interest as determined by the overnight index swap market. But for those posting weaker collateral the minimum bid is raised by 50 basis points, but not just that; BoE also insists on steep haircuts for "weaker collateral" (weaker than AAA-grade?) by offering as little as 60p in the pound for some foreign currency denominated CMBS. 60% puts this collateral firmnly in the sub-investment junk category? Hypo-Real might take that, but it's just not British.
This is only even a slight shift down in acceptable risk grades. In recent three-month auctions earlier this week, the Bank also accepted other countries’ government bonds, debt of US government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and AAA-rated tranches of prime European mortgages. That is not very wide - at worst the prices in the market are less than 10% down and this may be reflected in the bank's pricing? As of today (only until Nov. 18 subject to review on Oct.14) the class (but not the quality) of collateral is widened to include AAA-rated US securities backed by student, consumer and auto loans, senior tranches of US commercial mortgage-backed securities, US covered bonds, AAA-rated tranches of corporate bonds, and a wide range of other asset-backed commercial paper. Securitised student loans already carry a government underwriting guarantee. The others are all AAA too, although "a wide range of other CP" might include softer qualities, but generally the SLS (Special Liquidity Scheme) only seems to accept the highest rated paper. Yet, this dispensation carries a charge. "Given the further broadening of collateral, there will be a minimum bid rate of 50 basis points above the relevant overnight index swap (OIS) rate." An Overnight Index Swap (OIS) is an interest rate swap agreement where a fixed rate is swapped against a pre-determined published index of a daily overnight reference rate eg. SONIA (GBP) or EONIA (euro) for an agreed period. It is currently about 290 basis points, giving a price of 340bp not far off the very high TED spread of 380bp though slightly below 3 month dollar LIBOR at 433bp (and even higher in Europe at 533bp!), which represents a profound breakdown in interbank lending! Bankers are complaining that the billions of dollars of liquidity provided by central banks are not filtering into the loan market, which is paying punitive rates for euros, sterling and dollars in the overnight interbank market. What they are saying is that the Bank of England and others are not being as helpful as claimed. Mervyn King - Governor of the Bank of England - said today, "In these extraordinary market conditions, the Bank of England will take all actions necessary to ensure that the banking system has access to sufficient liquidity". Yes, liquidity, but not at rates that might help ease the liquidity squeeze. To ensure that it does not lend too cheaply, BoE insists that any bank willing to post some of the wider collateral may face a higher minimum bid in the auction (higher than those posting normal collateral). The minimum bid will be the three-month risk-free rate of interest as determined by the overnight index swap market. But for those posting weaker collateral the minimum bid is raised by 50 basis points, but not just that; BoE also insists on steep haircuts for "weaker collateral" (weaker than AAA-grade?) by offering as little as 60p in the pound for some foreign currency denominated CMBS. 60% puts this collateral firmnly in the sub-investment junk category? Hypo-Real might take that, but it's just not British.
Economy stupid!
For those who want to know how the economics of the crisis works I recommend http://www.levy.org/pubs/sa_nov_07.pdf where the authors (Godley et al.) forecast the economic dimension of the current crises accurately, blaming the fiscal stance, disproving laying blame (as some in the US have) on too much saving by the US economy's trading partners (even though more domestic spending by China, Japan and Germany would be good), and predicting (years ago) recession in the USA this year followed by resumed balanced growth by 2010 if the fiscal stance is suitably relaxed to 2% or higher deficit to GDP (= $300bn borrowing requirement, which may be somewhat conservative?). For the global aspects see
http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCOnePager63.pdf
http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCOnePager62.pdf
but the above forecasts may be much altered by exchange rate rise of the $US, see
http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCOnePager38.pdf
The extreme US trade deficit paid for by the foreign acquisition of net US financial assets that funded much of the growth in asset backed securities had its well-spring in US comsumers spending 6% more than their incomes, see
http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCOnePager30.pdf
Much of the above is work undertaken by the UN. For macro-economists, the world model essentials are in: http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper23.pdf
http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCTechnicalPaper1.pdf
An important point is to note that macro-economics warnings have been in train for years and were most clearly publicised since 2005, while before then I would say that technical warnings among bankers and economists were more subliminal!
http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCOnePager63.pdf
http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCOnePager62.pdf
but the above forecasts may be much altered by exchange rate rise of the $US, see
http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCOnePager38.pdf
The extreme US trade deficit paid for by the foreign acquisition of net US financial assets that funded much of the growth in asset backed securities had its well-spring in US comsumers spending 6% more than their incomes, see
http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCOnePager30.pdf
Much of the above is work undertaken by the UN. For macro-economists, the world model essentials are in: http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper23.pdf
http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCTechnicalPaper1.pdf
An important point is to note that macro-economics warnings have been in train for years and were most clearly publicised since 2005, while before then I would say that technical warnings among bankers and economists were more subliminal!
Blog des Blogs
If you'd like to know more about:
- Biden/Palin toe to toe see http://blogs.ft.com/crookblog/
- Warren Buffet's thinking see http://www.crossingwallstreet.com/
- Ireland's spectacular move see http://www.davidmcwilliams.ie/2008/10/01/lenihans-masterstroke-has-bought-us-time-to-sort-out-our-own-problems
- how the majority of US legislators think see http://robertreich.blogspot.com/
Wells Fargo taking over Wachovia instead of Citi and that WF will be recording Wach's impaired assets at 'fair value' see http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/home/permalink/?ndmViewId=news_view&newsId=20081003005242&newsLang=en
- support for the interesting contention that mutuality leaves financial firms less exposed, see http://blogs.ft.com/gapperblog/ Recall that regulators including the FSA before the liquidity crisis put a lot of pressure on mutuals to demutualise because they wanted the transparancy of firms being valued by equity markets, having those to raise capital in, and supposedly thereby better capitalised?
- "mark-to-realization" of loans (useful term) and the complaint that nothing is yet being done to tackle "parallel banking" (also called 'shadow banking') which is critical to the financial crisis, see http://blogs.ft.com/wolfforum/2008/10/why-federal-reserve-policy-is-failing/#more-201
- and for the acerbic view that "Unless the bond holders and other non-retail creditors get a serious haircut/pay a hefty charge in these bank rescue operations, the authorities will have achieved the worst possible combination of ex-post grotesque unfairness and ex-ante bad incentives for future financial misbehaviour" see http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/
- Biden/Palin toe to toe see http://blogs.ft.com/crookblog/
- Warren Buffet's thinking see http://www.crossingwallstreet.com/
- Ireland's spectacular move see http://www.davidmcwilliams.ie/2008/10/01/lenihans-masterstroke-has-bought-us-time-to-sort-out-our-own-problems
- how the majority of US legislators think see http://robertreich.blogspot.com/
Wells Fargo taking over Wachovia instead of Citi and that WF will be recording Wach's impaired assets at 'fair value' see http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/home/permalink/?ndmViewId=news_view&newsId=20081003005242&newsLang=en
- support for the interesting contention that mutuality leaves financial firms less exposed, see http://blogs.ft.com/gapperblog/ Recall that regulators including the FSA before the liquidity crisis put a lot of pressure on mutuals to demutualise because they wanted the transparancy of firms being valued by equity markets, having those to raise capital in, and supposedly thereby better capitalised?
- "mark-to-realization" of loans (useful term) and the complaint that nothing is yet being done to tackle "parallel banking" (also called 'shadow banking') which is critical to the financial crisis, see http://blogs.ft.com/wolfforum/2008/10/why-federal-reserve-policy-is-failing/#more-201
- and for the acerbic view that "Unless the bond holders and other non-retail creditors get a serious haircut/pay a hefty charge in these bank rescue operations, the authorities will have achieved the worst possible combination of ex-post grotesque unfairness and ex-ante bad incentives for future financial misbehaviour" see http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/
How much for toxic assets?



ABX indices (based on credit derivatives written on MBS backed by subprime mortgage loans) track the price of credit default insurance on a basket of such deals. Since the start of the CC liquidity squeeze (summer '07), the ABX indices are the barometer of the collapsing price/ valuations in the US subprime mortgage market, at the centre of the credit market turnmoil. ABX data is also used by banks and other
investors for hedging and trading and risk pricing of mortgage-backed portfolios generally.
TARP and similar schemes (e.g. swaps of RMBS securities at central bank windows when sub-triple-A tranches or pools are accepted - as BoE are now starting to do) are based on the belief that observed ABX mark-to-market prices are significantly less that their 'true fair value' where the value is based on model projections of what % of defaults in the underlying pool of subprime MBS will over the cycle turn into a net economic loss, after recoveries etc. Understanding the specific factors driving the variation of ABX prices is important for policymakers as changes in the weight of credit- and non-credit elements have different implications. For instance, indications of changes in risk appetite and the liquidity squeeze context may help explain the discrepancies between ABX market prices and estimated 'hold-to-maturity' values. What a BIS published study by Ingo Fender and Martin Scheicher show is that confidence factors and the effect of a high LIBOR over time explain about 30% of the fall in MBS prices. Therefore, central banks, US Treasury, and others could in all conscience offer at least 30% above current mark to market prices, even before the more complex modeling of hold-to-maturity valuations?
Empirical work on these important matters has rarely been made public (so far as I the BIS study and its references may be the only ones, though the US Fed or Treasury must publish something similar very soon). I know banks and hedge funds and others have such models (or are trying to build them) but may see them as a valuable competitive tool to be kept confidential whereby they might confidently buy valuable assets at fire-sale prices.
For those who wish to learn more I recommend pages 71-81 of the BIS Quarterly Stability Review, Sept. '08 - or contact me directly. The models employed in the BIS study are not the last word on the matter as a more complete economic model (rather than economic driver indicators treated individually) might improve the rubustness and extend the scope to all RMBS and CBMS.
Buying time
Commentators on the US TARP, the prospect of a smaller EU equivalent, or the Irish unlimited 2 year guarantee of major banks' deposits (and the banks' bondholders), plus the $2trillions approximately that central banks are providing worldwide via their money market operations - these are all measures to buy time - time for what? For however long it takes for markets to "calm down" (G.Brown), become more normal and orderly, less emotional and more technical regarding expectations. But, this is of course a difficult period to measure in months or years given that we are in the concertina squeeze of global recessions US -> UK&I, Can, Aus -> EU -> Japan ->China, India and rest of the world, and therefore banks' delinquency rates are tending up while recovery and size of economic losses to banks depends on how efficient long chains of structured finance liabilities can be netted and unravelled and, most of all, how long it takes for the economic cycle (and credit cycle) to be palpably on the rise again. Judging by all past recessions, the average is about a year from peak to trough and 5-6 years from trough to a level matching the last peak. Bankers are saying little, while regulators, economists and politicians are all avoiding answering the question that mortgage borrowers and others ask, how long until we're back to 'normal'? The US and UK answers could be 2-3 years, but by then the EU will be barely off its cycle floor. A confident answer would be to say 4-5 years, which usefully places it just beyond the reach of current governments' tenures.
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