TARP was hobbled by political conditions (see "Agony Aunt" among old posts below) and by the contradition between buying assets at a generous margin above fire-sale and the idea of doing this by reverse auction. In any case these are novelties and the tried and tested solution from history has surely been nationalisation of banks!
Yesterday I listened to a US radio commentary on TARP which suggested that at the last moment language had been inserted into the legislation (by person or persons unknown) allowing the government the option of stock infusion rather than toxic asset purchase, In other words rather than face the conundrum of having to price unmarketable debt assets and their "toxic" risk projections, the tax payer (i.e. the Fed and US Treasury, who are rarely if ever referred to as the taxpayer at any other time?) could follow the Warren Buffet example, and enjoy the powers and benefits of preferential stock. If so, I imagine the lobbying weight (what's left of that) of the banks will be brought to bear to ensure this option will never be acknowledged publicly, still less exercised, unless of course some banks would like to be consolidated with others at government behest given that government surely does not want to be left with a shareholding of a bank that can't repay its TARP loan.
It is worthy of note that massive consolidation of Europe's banks (and of US regional and local banks) has been predicted for years as a necessary outcome of Basel II. But, it is also clear that big banking groups are dysfunctional and internalising to many transactions and supporting 'shadow-banking' that should be part of transparant regulated markets i.e. let's have no more dark pools and opaque or hidden crossing networks etc. There are those who want to strip the banks back to tradional banking only; no more or only limited proprietary trading. But, while the interbank credit squeeze may have nefarious causes allowing banks to prey on each other, it could also have arisen if less extreme even if all banks had stuck to traditonal banking. It is systemic and not just the fault of individual banks. Therefore, the idea of bringing capital markets fully on-exchange may be the better solution than haphazard bail-outs (see Creditowrthy Exchange Idea among 'older posts')
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Monday, 6 October 2008
Most read
Note: The most reader acclaimed recent blogs may be found below. They are among "older posts" - click at bottom of page:
AGONY AUNT
ECONOMY STUPID
HOW MUCH FOR TOXIC ASSETS and
DEAD PARROT (in blog2: crunch images, which you can reach via the 'profile' page)
Also on profile page click on the other blogs listed for up to date news & opinion.
AGONY AUNT
ECONOMY STUPID
HOW MUCH FOR TOXIC ASSETS and
DEAD PARROT (in blog2: crunch images, which you can reach via the 'profile' page)
Also on profile page click on the other blogs listed for up to date news & opinion.
Lehman's complaint
Lehman Brothers lobbied the US Federal Reserve in July to convert to a traditional bank, but the Fed refused to support the idea! At the same time it asked the Fed to extend credit to include more types of collateral. Again, no! These steps have since been taken by Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs. And TARP, and other central bank initiatives, have set up to take wider collateral. It seems Lehmans was sacrificed pour encourager les autres. But then no-one wanted to buy it except BarCAP and they couldn't get a soift deal from the Fed. Lehman met with Bank of America and thought to sell itself to Morgan Stanley, HSBC or Nomura before it filed and BarCap was at the table. Note there was no thought to sell to Citibank whose collateral call had begun Lehmans' slide and steep falls in ABS and CDO prices. Other possible suitors included AIG before it got sick, GE and Abu Dhabi IA, other ME and Asian funds, and private equity firms. Becoming a bank could also have kept Lehman's wholesale funding from collapsing until the bank could metamorphose into a deposit-taking bank. The Fed, was unwilling to change the rules or accept other collateral in exchange for credit, fearing that Lehman could be stigmatised if it converted to a bank. Seems as if individual supervision got confused with the systemic bigger picture. Lehmans rehypothecation of other firms' collateral and a host of other accounting issues and wide-ranging counterparty exposures are so much more difficult to unravel when in the hands of administrators than if in the hands of another bank. This must be a lesson whenever the choice arises again between fees for accountants and lawyers or letting a bigger merged entity work its way through the balance sheet. Maybe this is the lesson that's been learned in the cases of Fortis and HBoS?
Half full or half empty?

In the week of TARP’s vote $1 trillion of US equities evaporated. UK stocks fell 7.8%today, furthest than any time in 21 years. Germany’s Xetra Dax 30 fell 7.1%, the CAC 40 fell 9%. FTSE Eurofirst 300 fell 7.4%, biggest drop since Black Monday in 1987. OLondon’s biggest fallers were HBOS down 19.8%, LTSB -10.8%, RBS -20.5%, HSBC down only 4.8%. Even the 100% deposit protected banks fell: Anglo Irish Bank fell 21.6%, Allied Irish Banks -15.8%, Bank of Ireland -18.6%. The list of the biggest falling shares on FTSE Eurofirst 300 are the continent’s biggest banks. UBS fell 12.8%, Belgium’s Dexia (not big) -21.2%, Commerzbank-Dresdner lost 17.7%, Deutsche Bank down 10.8%, SocGen fell -10.1%, UniCredit fell 9%%. US indices are falling too (nearly 5% down), maybe another $0.5tn gets wiped!
Does this matter if a recovery springs from TARP’s $700bn bad bank bailout, or is it too little, too late to avert an even worse debt collapse?. Is TARP looking already like a busted flush? Have the markets decided it simply won't work? Maybe the conditions attaching (see earlier blogs) have been understood as major handicaps.
Let's look at some more of TARP’s highlights and lowlights. They are:
§ FDIC's list of 117 problem banks (assets of $78bn). The list does not include any of the large banks that have failed or been forced to merge this year.
§ Weiss Research Inc. lists 1,479 U.S. banks and 258 thrifts at risk of failure (total assets of $3.2 trillion), 41 times FDIC estimates.
The US Fed & Treasury assume debt problems may be resolved by focusing on banks with financial assets gone bad. But what if the reality is that bad debts are bad everywhere, and increasingly so if a deep and prolonged recession takes hold?
At Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae and other government agencies, there are $5.4tn in residential mortgages 30% of these may be seriously impaired. But, as we should all know, commercial property values sink lower than residential in a property crash, and this may be true of commercial mortgages too? In the US, beyond residential mortgages, there are $2.6 trillion in commercial mortgages. Again, perhaps 30% are vulnerable to delinquency and 90 day plus defaults. And beyond all mortgages, there are another $20.4tn in consumer and corporate debts — all subject to the same risk of tripling or higher of today’s delinquency rates. Not all, not even the majority, can default however. Many mortgage holders will retain positive equity even in a 30-40% property value fall. When some businesses go bust, there may be more business for others, although there is also a systemic knock-on effect from bankruptcies.
TARP is designed to help clean up debts that have gone bad already. Future impaired loans are another matter. If the economy is revivable beginning in 2009, maybe this will not be insurmountable by better-capitalised banks, even if recession is currently still gaining momentum (half a million jobs lost so far in 6 months).
Another issue is credit derivatives exposure. Of about $182tn nominal value of outstanding derivatives contracts, $54tn are credit derivatives. The US big 4, Citibank, JPMorgan Chase (+Bear Stearns), Bank of America Merril Lynch, Wells Fargo Wachovia— are exposed to far more nominal credit risk on their derivatives than they have capital. While derivatives mostly net out there may be a large residual exposure of perhaps $1-3tn?
The Fed, after committing $200bn for Fannie & Freddie, $85bn for AIG, $25bn for the auto industry, $700bn for TARP (+ $150 billion tacked on to the plan for pork barrel tax cuts), and $100sbn in liquidity loans can Washington’s rescue measures still fall short of what’s needed to cope with $ trillions of other economic losses?
Before these bailouts, the OMB projected a 2009 federal budget deficit rise to $482bn. It would be wrong to consider the above expenditures as simply adding to this since most is money market roll-overs, swaps and loans. As argued in earlier blogs, if TARP restores confidence and works as intended there is an immediate $0.5tn gain and future profit for taxpayers. Insofar as Federal bonds are issued against securities collateral, there is also unlikely to be a crowding out effect that would push up interest rates.
Today, maybe not today, perhaps this week, we'll learn for certain if global financial markets welcome TARP or reject it with jaded, clenched teeth or death's head grins? Since TARP was signed on Friday, the Dow has plunged 2% and if it follows other markets today perhaps by another 5-6% after steep falls in Europe and Asia? Not a welcome relief! Are markets driven only by growling bears who specialise in discounting all hope as merely smoke ‘n mirrors, or can there be some hope for reviving bulls any time before some bank stocks, for some reason, somehow lead the charge instead of expecting central banks to engineer it?
Sunday in Washington
Sunday night was also a working day at the Federal Reserve and US Treasury thinking up how to follow TARP with further measures to jump-start the credit markets e.g. additional liquidity operations, a rate cut, co-ordination with other central banks etc. The Fed is likely to further expand both the size and scope of its liquidity operations. Bankers are complaining about a shortage of US Treasuries to be bought in the normal way - too much is conditional swap material and everyone else is holding what they've got. What happens when US Treasuries are unavailable in the secondary markets? One relief measure may be expanding the Term Securities Lending Facility, created by the Fed in March to help banks access liquidity. Another is the CP market, also shrinking substantially. Money market funds could be permissioned to borrow money from banks to fund their holdings of CP, but they have a lot already from the hedge funds? What is the Fed offers term loans on an unsecured basis to regulated banks at a fixed spread over its main interest, therefore heavily pulling down the 3 month LIBOR? Or, why not just order banks to lend to each other at a fixed rate, especially if the Fed guarantees no more bank failures this year or next? TARP allows the Treasury to guarantee the Fed against any losses incurred in such operations and gives the Fed the power to pay interest on reserves to help smoothe liquidity operations. That would be radical?
Next Monday may see the publication of TARP's detailed guidelines and selection of a handful of private asset managers to run the programme. Hank Paulson, Treasury secretary, vowed to “move rapidly to implement the new authorities, but also methodically” and insisted “transparency” would be important throughout. Transparancy may be TARP's downfall, however, if banks applying to TARP are thereby exposed to reputational risk as discussed below in earlier blogs. TARP's mechanism is a reverse-auction for the acquisition of toxic assets from a range of financial institutions, but cannot function before November! A reverse auction may also expose who among the banks are the most desperate! It says little for the idea that the Fed and US Treasury are going to make fair value valuations of somewhere between fire-sale and hold-to-maturity prices? Why couldn't a reverse auction merely confirm current fire-sale prices? Hey, I'm a private AM; I'd like to earn the fees on this.
Next Monday may see the publication of TARP's detailed guidelines and selection of a handful of private asset managers to run the programme. Hank Paulson, Treasury secretary, vowed to “move rapidly to implement the new authorities, but also methodically” and insisted “transparency” would be important throughout. Transparancy may be TARP's downfall, however, if banks applying to TARP are thereby exposed to reputational risk as discussed below in earlier blogs. TARP's mechanism is a reverse-auction for the acquisition of toxic assets from a range of financial institutions, but cannot function before November! A reverse auction may also expose who among the banks are the most desperate! It says little for the idea that the Fed and US Treasury are going to make fair value valuations of somewhere between fire-sale and hold-to-maturity prices? Why couldn't a reverse auction merely confirm current fire-sale prices? Hey, I'm a private AM; I'd like to earn the fees on this.
stocks ticking down despite TARP!
With the jitters caused by major banks turning turtle (Fortis, HRE etc.), which could not be worse timed for TARP and for banks generally, European financial stocks suffered sharp losses. TARP may have lost the psychological moment of maximum impact because of Congessional and Presidential arm-wrestling. The FTSE 100 was not helped by Asian markets falling, news of stricken banks, and recession fears quantified by bank analysts on the front pages of the Sunday press. It rapidly fell 4.8%, with the Dax and CAC 40 also about 5% down. Oil dipped below $90 for the first time since February, which for me is a sign of rising $ against the €, and good news as we head into winter fuel demand.

UK Recession fears are based on forecasts by economists at leading banks all predicting 2-3 quarters of negative growth for the UK next year and 700,000 more registered unemployed. Curiously the CBI survey suggests we are in recession already yet only 350,000 jobs will be lost next year? This is finger-in-the-air stuff since the Government has options open to it along the lines of how the UK avoided recession in 2001/02, but also because we will not know the true GDP figures for another 1-2 years and may (most likely) be in recession already!
We have to wait to see if the passing of TARP and expectation of funds repatriation to the US markets from Europe (attracted by TARP and by the rising $) persuade the Dow, NASDAQ, S&P etc. to tick strongly upwards. If not, then this is a vote of no-confidence for now in TARP! That would be a seismic shock, politically and economically! I hold to my forecast, however, that shares will rise, including banks' shares, through the enxt 3 months as we head for Christmas.
It was enough of a shock that Asia-Pacific markets sank today as investors focused on growing concerns about a global recession and more banks falling victim to the credit crisis, thereby leaving the passing of the US government’s TARP to fade into the background. The Nikkei 225 dropped to the lowest in four and a half years, losing 4.3%, while the broader Topix sank by 4.7%. Said one trader reported by the FT, “It’s absolutely the worst I’ve ever seen; people are tired, so it’s almost not even dramatic anymore when you see the declines. Everyone’s still so shell shocked after September and things are still going down.”
It's all up to the US investors and traders now to show their mettle. If the US shrugs off Europe's agonising and shares head north, it will be like moving directly from 1914 to 1917 and the arrival of the Americans at the front-lines in Belgium and France! In an earlier age we might actually worry about the prospects of war - how much better to only have an economic crisis and everyone talking to each other constructively we trust!

UK Recession fears are based on forecasts by economists at leading banks all predicting 2-3 quarters of negative growth for the UK next year and 700,000 more registered unemployed. Curiously the CBI survey suggests we are in recession already yet only 350,000 jobs will be lost next year? This is finger-in-the-air stuff since the Government has options open to it along the lines of how the UK avoided recession in 2001/02, but also because we will not know the true GDP figures for another 1-2 years and may (most likely) be in recession already!
We have to wait to see if the passing of TARP and expectation of funds repatriation to the US markets from Europe (attracted by TARP and by the rising $) persuade the Dow, NASDAQ, S&P etc. to tick strongly upwards. If not, then this is a vote of no-confidence for now in TARP! That would be a seismic shock, politically and economically! I hold to my forecast, however, that shares will rise, including banks' shares, through the enxt 3 months as we head for Christmas.
It was enough of a shock that Asia-Pacific markets sank today as investors focused on growing concerns about a global recession and more banks falling victim to the credit crisis, thereby leaving the passing of the US government’s TARP to fade into the background. The Nikkei 225 dropped to the lowest in four and a half years, losing 4.3%, while the broader Topix sank by 4.7%. Said one trader reported by the FT, “It’s absolutely the worst I’ve ever seen; people are tired, so it’s almost not even dramatic anymore when you see the declines. Everyone’s still so shell shocked after September and things are still going down.”
It's all up to the US investors and traders now to show their mettle. If the US shrugs off Europe's agonising and shares head north, it will be like moving directly from 1914 to 1917 and the arrival of the Americans at the front-lines in Belgium and France! In an earlier age we might actually worry about the prospects of war - how much better to only have an economic crisis and everyone talking to each other constructively we trust!
Sunday, 5 October 2008
Sunday's travels in Hypo-reality
The flurry of announcements, if not about financial security, sound like the mobilisation announcements in 1914 by one European power after another!
Germany’s decision to guarantee all deposits, following Ireland and Greece's example, is most embarassing after the Bundesbank had stated clearly that Germany's banks are insulated from the credit crunch and US sub-prime exposures (though clearly not the case for Dresdner Bank and some others). The FT report that Germany says it will guarantee all private German bank accounts – currently worth €568bn – in a dramatic move to prevent panic withdrawals as financial crisis spreads to Europe's largest economy. What is curious about this (details not yet available) is that Ireland's 100% coverag of deposits is worth €400bn, so why is Germany's only worth 42% more - something wrong here surely? The answer is probably that Germany's guarantee only cover "privat" accounts, not business accounts.
In the UK, the Government is worried about small businesses and wants a €12bn EU-wide initiative, but this seems scarcely adequate. It is also considering intervention in the form of convertible loans whereby the Government can emulate Warren Buffet's profitable approach to helping banks.
Actions to protect all depositors' savings (personal or personal & business) follows what was briefly deemed controversial (and even against single market rules) by Ireland. This was criticised in the UK as un fair competition for depoits. But, the funds flow into Irish banks from UK banks was probably mainly by Irish citizens. The UK had double the level of deposit insurance protection compared to Ireland and other EU countries (typiclly £35k v. €20k) for years without complaint.
The UK and France were trying on Sunday to learn details of the German plan, but had not done so by this morning! They are concerned to avoid cross-border flights of capital. At the EU weekend summit, chaired by France, leaders from France, Germany, Italy and the UK agreed not to let any large financial institution fail (according to people close to the talks).
The Danish government this morning guaranteed all bank deposits in a deal with banks (i.e. banks pay into a liquidation fund) covering up a Dkr35bn ($6.5bn) liquidation fund. Austria and Portugal are quickly following, but may wait on the German details before clarifying what the new limit will be, if not 100% for private deposits. It seems no news is good news in the case of Spain?
The Belgian government agreed with BNP Paribas to sell it a controlling stake in the remaining Fortis assets following the shock nationalisation of Fortis’s Dutch banking and insurance businesses on Friday that in effect cancelled the bank's banking and insurance licenses in what was Fortis's country of origin until it became Belgium's biggest bank.
In Iceland, where the 3 main banks appear properly solvent, the PM said at a press conference on Sunday he hoped to announce a partial rescue package for the banking sector, and refused to comment on the idea that Kaupthing would take over Landsbanki. The PM and central bankers were also in talks with pension funds and banks as the country looked overseas for freeing up short term funding. Then the latest; trading in all Icelandic banks's shares halted and Kauphing ordered to sell foreign assets and focus more on domestic loans and less abroad!
On Sunday too, the Italian bank UniCredit approved the raising €6bn in new capital to shore up its defences against a falling share price (asking shareholders for €2.5bn convertible bonds, scrapping its cash dividend and to issue shares equivalent to another €3.5bn in core capital. This is a surprise as the Italian banks have been the most conservative consumer credit and mortgage lenders. Of all OECD countries, Italy has been the least of a credit boom economy. The title for this blog comes from Umberto Eco's essay "Travels in Hyper-reality" where history and business cultures of Europe and USA are each viewed by the other as if down the wrong end of a telescope.
German Government embarassment is total. Ministers very recently pooh-poohed any necessity to have access to TARP or a European equivalent. Days later all that is dust in the mouth. Government and financial regulators yesterday (Sontag) agreed a revised bail-out package for Hypo Real Estate after the abrupt re-calibration of capital needs as measured only a week ago! Angela Merkel, the German chancellor pledged not to let HRE endanger the country’s financial system. HRE (with a €400bn,$550bn balance sheet), one of Europe’s biggest commercial property lenders, which would be the biggest bank failure in modern Germany with cross-border repercussions. Ms Merkel warned the HRE’s managers they face sanctions if they are not forthcoming about all the risks the bank took. Clearly, there had been some number-crunching through the accounts during the week that threw up far more in potential losses than were known only a week earlier! (And here we may be mindful of the action by the DNB in the Netherlands over Fortis Netherlands.) HRE needed liquidity lines from banks and the Bundesbank because it could not get enough short-term, unsecured finance to support Depfa, its Ireland-based (off-shore?) public sector lending arm. The first rescue attempt in which the German governement would provide most of the €35bn credit guarantee required to enable HRE to borrow (having lost AA-status). The second deal raised the amount to €50bn from €35bn and Government raised its credit guarantee from the €25.6bn to €35bn with €15bn from other banks.
At the same time, spreading a security blanket over the whole banking sector was possibly a condition that the other German banks insisted upon to remain involved with HRE's rescue? The banks that pledged support had during the weekend at first pulled out of the second deal when they saw €15bn was now required, having previously only agreed to €9bn. The HRE bank's accounting system was now severely in question? If no deal had been struck by today, the collapse of HRE would have had repercussions not only on the other banks (and their shares have fallen anyway) but just as importantly on the all important market that finances Germany's largest branks, Pfandbriefe, bank covered bonds. HRE is a Munich-based group (Bavaria) and was a major issuer of the Pfandbriefe, which are backed by high-quality pools of conservatively valued property collateral and/or corporate loans. HRE is not a retail bank, so the issue was not one of protecting retail customers and SME's per se.
All this had political repercussions too at the polls days earlier. The HRE crisis also followed on from severe embarassments in February, also in Bavaria, over Hypo-Vereins Bank and the Bavarian State Bank, which became the butt of satirical comment: see http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,538200-2,00.html
The conservative CSU lost Bavaria a week ago, which is a blow to its partner the CDU which governs Federally. The CSU had campaigned Under the slogan, “Socially acceptable is he who makes no debts,” and on this basis cuts were made in various social programmes (mainly education and health) even though the budget has been balanced for 3 years and there had been a dramatic increase in numbers in poverty! The state government freed up large sums to cover the losses of the Bavarian State Bank (Bavaria LB, which in April reported losses of €4.7bn due to speculation in the US sub-prime paper, plus €300m lost due to the collapse of Lehman Bros. The state government undertook to cover losses with €6bn (as a direct cost to taxpayers). The CSU then lost power in Bavaria for the first time in half a century!
Germany’s decision to guarantee all deposits, following Ireland and Greece's example, is most embarassing after the Bundesbank had stated clearly that Germany's banks are insulated from the credit crunch and US sub-prime exposures (though clearly not the case for Dresdner Bank and some others). The FT report that Germany says it will guarantee all private German bank accounts – currently worth €568bn – in a dramatic move to prevent panic withdrawals as financial crisis spreads to Europe's largest economy. What is curious about this (details not yet available) is that Ireland's 100% coverag of deposits is worth €400bn, so why is Germany's only worth 42% more - something wrong here surely? The answer is probably that Germany's guarantee only cover "privat" accounts, not business accounts.
In the UK, the Government is worried about small businesses and wants a €12bn EU-wide initiative, but this seems scarcely adequate. It is also considering intervention in the form of convertible loans whereby the Government can emulate Warren Buffet's profitable approach to helping banks.
Actions to protect all depositors' savings (personal or personal & business) follows what was briefly deemed controversial (and even against single market rules) by Ireland. This was criticised in the UK as un fair competition for depoits. But, the funds flow into Irish banks from UK banks was probably mainly by Irish citizens. The UK had double the level of deposit insurance protection compared to Ireland and other EU countries (typiclly £35k v. €20k) for years without complaint.
The UK and France were trying on Sunday to learn details of the German plan, but had not done so by this morning! They are concerned to avoid cross-border flights of capital. At the EU weekend summit, chaired by France, leaders from France, Germany, Italy and the UK agreed not to let any large financial institution fail (according to people close to the talks).
The Danish government this morning guaranteed all bank deposits in a deal with banks (i.e. banks pay into a liquidation fund) covering up a Dkr35bn ($6.5bn) liquidation fund. Austria and Portugal are quickly following, but may wait on the German details before clarifying what the new limit will be, if not 100% for private deposits. It seems no news is good news in the case of Spain?
The Belgian government agreed with BNP Paribas to sell it a controlling stake in the remaining Fortis assets following the shock nationalisation of Fortis’s Dutch banking and insurance businesses on Friday that in effect cancelled the bank's banking and insurance licenses in what was Fortis's country of origin until it became Belgium's biggest bank.
In Iceland, where the 3 main banks appear properly solvent, the PM said at a press conference on Sunday he hoped to announce a partial rescue package for the banking sector, and refused to comment on the idea that Kaupthing would take over Landsbanki. The PM and central bankers were also in talks with pension funds and banks as the country looked overseas for freeing up short term funding. Then the latest; trading in all Icelandic banks's shares halted and Kauphing ordered to sell foreign assets and focus more on domestic loans and less abroad!
On Sunday too, the Italian bank UniCredit approved the raising €6bn in new capital to shore up its defences against a falling share price (asking shareholders for €2.5bn convertible bonds, scrapping its cash dividend and to issue shares equivalent to another €3.5bn in core capital. This is a surprise as the Italian banks have been the most conservative consumer credit and mortgage lenders. Of all OECD countries, Italy has been the least of a credit boom economy. The title for this blog comes from Umberto Eco's essay "Travels in Hyper-reality" where history and business cultures of Europe and USA are each viewed by the other as if down the wrong end of a telescope.
German Government embarassment is total. Ministers very recently pooh-poohed any necessity to have access to TARP or a European equivalent. Days later all that is dust in the mouth. Government and financial regulators yesterday (Sontag) agreed a revised bail-out package for Hypo Real Estate after the abrupt re-calibration of capital needs as measured only a week ago! Angela Merkel, the German chancellor pledged not to let HRE endanger the country’s financial system. HRE (with a €400bn,$550bn balance sheet), one of Europe’s biggest commercial property lenders, which would be the biggest bank failure in modern Germany with cross-border repercussions. Ms Merkel warned the HRE’s managers they face sanctions if they are not forthcoming about all the risks the bank took. Clearly, there had been some number-crunching through the accounts during the week that threw up far more in potential losses than were known only a week earlier! (And here we may be mindful of the action by the DNB in the Netherlands over Fortis Netherlands.) HRE needed liquidity lines from banks and the Bundesbank because it could not get enough short-term, unsecured finance to support Depfa, its Ireland-based (off-shore?) public sector lending arm. The first rescue attempt in which the German governement would provide most of the €35bn credit guarantee required to enable HRE to borrow (having lost AA-status). The second deal raised the amount to €50bn from €35bn and Government raised its credit guarantee from the €25.6bn to €35bn with €15bn from other banks.
At the same time, spreading a security blanket over the whole banking sector was possibly a condition that the other German banks insisted upon to remain involved with HRE's rescue? The banks that pledged support had during the weekend at first pulled out of the second deal when they saw €15bn was now required, having previously only agreed to €9bn. The HRE bank's accounting system was now severely in question? If no deal had been struck by today, the collapse of HRE would have had repercussions not only on the other banks (and their shares have fallen anyway) but just as importantly on the all important market that finances Germany's largest branks, Pfandbriefe, bank covered bonds. HRE is a Munich-based group (Bavaria) and was a major issuer of the Pfandbriefe, which are backed by high-quality pools of conservatively valued property collateral and/or corporate loans. HRE is not a retail bank, so the issue was not one of protecting retail customers and SME's per se.
All this had political repercussions too at the polls days earlier. The HRE crisis also followed on from severe embarassments in February, also in Bavaria, over Hypo-Vereins Bank and the Bavarian State Bank, which became the butt of satirical comment: see http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,538200-2,00.html
The conservative CSU lost Bavaria a week ago, which is a blow to its partner the CDU which governs Federally. The CSU had campaigned Under the slogan, “Socially acceptable is he who makes no debts,” and on this basis cuts were made in various social programmes (mainly education and health) even though the budget has been balanced for 3 years and there had been a dramatic increase in numbers in poverty! The state government freed up large sums to cover the losses of the Bavarian State Bank (Bavaria LB, which in April reported losses of €4.7bn due to speculation in the US sub-prime paper, plus €300m lost due to the collapse of Lehman Bros. The state government undertook to cover losses with €6bn (as a direct cost to taxpayers). The CSU then lost power in Bavaria for the first time in half a century!
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