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Wednesday, 8 October 2008

Too Big fails - or just gallows humour?


The Times following up on a Telegraph story report that the Government is thought to be reluctant to consent to RBS’s participation in the bailout unless the chief executive relinquishes his role. Ministers are anxious that they are not seen to be forcing the hand of the RBS board. Asked about Sir Fred’s position, Alistair Darling, the Chancellor, said management changes at RBS were not the business of the Government. But ministers believe that it would be politically unacceptable for the man who led RBS to the brink of failure to continue running the bank with public money. Sir Fred has been blamed for RBS’s financial woes after he pushed through a €71 billion consortium bid for ABN Amro last year. This hit the bank’s Tier 1 capital, forcing the bank to raise £12 billion in a rights issue.
It is a tragedy or sorts for a great 300 year old bank (The Tories' bank, Margaret Thatcher's favourite), almost Shakespearean (MacBeth), as Chief executive Sir Fred Goodwin and chairman Sir Tom McKillop are today (as reported confidently in detail before breakfast) ousted, resigned and replaced (until this was denied abruptly with no detail by the bank) from what was one of the world's biggest banks, and proudly Scottish, its Saltire plastered all over Edinburgh airport, walking distance from its massive new HQ for 3,000 nestling in a woodland estate. They are to be replaced so the story went by Stephen Hester, formerly of the Abbey, and Sir Philip Hampton, currently chairman of Sainsbury's. It would be unusual for the story to be a malicious rumour with this level of detail. The departure of RBS's top management seems logical the day after its shares fell 39pc (£10bn) instantly over funding fears when S&P cut its correspondent banking ratings below AA-, and just when the PM and Chancellor (both Scottish) throw a £50bn lifeboat to UK banks. The fear is that there is more under the bonnet of RBS that smells toxic than is on balance sheet, but even so Fred the Shred as he was familiarly known after sacking 18,000 out of NatWest, is surely a victim of bad timing and circumstances (including overpaying for AAB) beyond even his big bank's powers to control? Maybe, but he should have listened to the economists and then asked himself whether it made sense to attempt an aggressive bid for another country's champion bank, to outcompete Barclays but only for the investment banking parts of AAB? RBS shares that had peaked at £5.97 closed yesterday at 90p. Until the 2Q 2008 the bank looked like it had a chance to be a winner from the crisis with its shares only down in line with the general market and holding up better than other major UK banks albeit falling to one half and then one third of the value of HSBC that only a year earlier it looked like rivalling. The bank looked relatively immune from the sub-prime credit crunch in 3&4Q 2007 but for no good reason except that it was in a bidding war for AAB, and therefore should be left alone, a bidding war that it won exactly a year ago to the day - but by then AAB was a shell of its former self; the competition had taken too long and victory tasted sour (the real winner being Santander who got AAB's Brazilian bank). Curiously, for a bank so proud of its history, its most recent history of buying AAB did not get added into the website:
http://www.rbs.com/about03.asp?id=ABOUT_US/OUR_HERITAGE/OUR_HISTORY/OUR_BANKING_FAMILY/STORY_RBS
Fred managed to keep amazingly silent for months about the financial crisis - maybe having little genuinely safe to say? - and RBS only really fell off its perch in the last few months. There were problems with its regulatory risk reporting, but then all banks have those. The bank's sub-prime exposures are in the USA, some of which was deemed non-material for regulatory reporting in the UK, that together with UK securitisations amounted to about $85bn before writedowns (excluding various legal risk liabilities carried by Citizens' hundreds of legal suits and RBS Greenwich Capital that had fee-based involvement in over half a $trillion of asset-backed securitisations, many of low quality, and from which the top managers quietly resigned in mid-2007). The bank in the last year lost over £80bn in equity, most of it in recent months, only in part because of buying AAB's wholesale banking divisions for something north of £20bn, at 70% premium despite the need for substantial capital raising including another £20bn or so to re-capitalise the banking operations of the new purchase. The few £bn in expected savings could not turn this into a short term coup, least of all when investment banking as a sector turned south. Commentators referred to 'Imperial ambition.' Fred had been under resignation pressure from shareholders for months and wanted a repeat of the NatWest glory - a bridge too far. Concerns over the group continued, compounded further when credit ratings agency S&P cut its rating over fears about future earnings and write-downs. The downgrade meant it would have problems with unsecured interbank borrowing. Sir Fred had earlier assured investors he remained the best man for the job after first half pre-tax losses of £691m. Concerns continued about writedowns and integration costs at ABN AMRO as well RBS's own toxic exposures.
The new team is Stephen Hester (ex-CEO British Land, which he joined in 2004 after 19 years under the charismatic and sometimes terrifying Hans-Jurg Rudloff at CSFB, in various Investment Banker roles before becoming CFO in 1996, then Global Head Fixed Income, and someone who knows all about M&A) and Sir Philip Hampton (FD of Lloyds TSB until 2004, which he left after falling out over strategy). The question that many will be asking is whether RBS will now follow HBOS in being taken over, or take fullest advantage of Government's capital infusion to bolster its book and share value (now only £14bn) to survive as a standalone bank (founded 1728) or take over or merge on a voluntary basis with another bank. Meanwhile, it has sizeable banking assets in the USA that may be sold however cheaply, and NATWEST (also Direct Line and Coutts) continues to be a large brand that could be sold, although disentangling the infrastructure would be a challenge.
Fred the Shred's last foray was to meet Chancellor Darling and regulators, along with the heads of Barclays, Lloyds TSB and HBOS, on Monday night, to discuss the crisis. Did he know or was he told it was time to go? Well, strange to tell, the bank boldly denies that Goodwin and Killip are going or gone. It was strange that successors were found so sonn if the reason for going was Monday's 39% share fall (nearly 50% in 2 days). Maybe Fred has second thoughts when he learned the outline of the Government's package (see blog below) and cancelled or postponed his departure - after all RBS is up 14% so far today!
Sir Fred Goodwin, 50, managed over £40bn of acquisitions since 2000 including £23.6bn for NatWest in 2000, $10.3bn in 2004 for Charter One Financial, about $19bn in 2007 for the investment banking and Asian units of ABN AMRO Holding. RBS raised £12.3bn by selling shares at 200 pence in June. Today the shares trade for half that much and the value of the whole bank (measured by the share price, not by book value) reached as little as £14-15bn! There would have to be a good reason not to resign in these circumstances! The share price is totally incredible when considered against the undoubted value of businesses in the RBS group, not least asset management and those earmarked for possible sale, Direct Line and Churchill insurance businesses. If RBS was not a bank it would be the ideal hugely profitable target for private equity asset stripping. A flurry of interested bidders would double or triple the share price and still leave room for break-up profit.
Before denying the resignation story (not rumour) RBS denied ``speculation'' yesterday that it asked the government for financial help to replenish their capital reserves.
RBS isn't alone in potential banking consolidation. There have been a record $232.5bn of financial services deals (all cheap and all without M&A advisory fees) in the past five weeks since Bank of America takeover of Merrill Lynch in September. I can only expect that UK banks' shares will rise now following the government's assurances and that no broker advice notes can fail to mark each of them as a strong 'buy', not 'hold' or 'sell.' Even when the dot com bubble burst and Tech stocks fell 90% this was mainly medium and small tech stocks; the biggest recovered rapidly. In the case of banks investors' fears are not really that the banks are worth so little - everyone agrees the banks are massively oversold - the fear is that they could go bankrupt or be taken over by other banks or by government and shareholders get nothing. The banks' share prices are therefore not measures of business value or measures of mark-to-market asset values; they now reflect entirely the extreme riskiness in turbulent panic-ridden markets of owning shares.
Equity is typically two thirds to half, sometimes three-quarters, of a bank's "own capital" that as a ratio to gross assets should be about 4%, to risk-weighted assets about 8% and 10-12% given today's once in a century extreme conditions. It is not hard to have predicted that over the course of a recession banks have to replenish up to 90% of their capital reserves. This becomes extremely hard to do when equity prices fall so far and so fast. Governments and central banks are concerned to restore banks' capital reserves (RBS and others are at levels of half to one third what they should be). But they neglected to appreciate that when they forced and supported mergers and break-ups of banks (N.Rock, Lehmans, Bear Stearns, Fortis) shareholders were entirely neglected despite the obvious fact that book value was worth more than the shares, and subsidiary businesses were worth more than the group price. Shareholders' confidence in the risk of share-owning has been fatally harmed - perhaps the greatest of all "moral hazards" in bail-outs of banks so-called. Can banks' capital be restructured without restoring shareholders' confidence in owning bank shares? When Ireland moved to protect business depositors and bondholders as well as retail depositors this was a big step forward. Governments now deciding to take equity in banks is the next step forward and deciding that there will be no more big bank failures adds weight to this. Governments too readily gave in to the idea that the real shareholders in banks are retail depositors only as if the banks were all mutual societies not publicly quoted! Shares are also owned by and on behalf of rich and poor households (pensions, life assurance, retail investment funds etc.). It is instructive that financial service firms that remained mutual or private have survived the current bloodbath much better - this was not what regulators thought should be the case when in recent years they put firms like Standard Life under pressure to de-mutualise on the basis of the idea that they would therefore be safer by being subject to equity market valuations! So, I conclude, that the next phase of the crisis has to be about restoring the value, role and security of shareholding!

Downing Street Heads for N Agreements


I'm well used to working through to the small hours. Darling went up to lie down at 01:30 and final statements for issuing publicly were spell-checked by 05:00 while I watched the US Presidential debate, noting how incredibly dumbed down the language and uncomfortable both candidates are on economic matters compared to our much more technically savvy leaders! I cat-napped for an hour or so until my mobile was fizzing with pre-breakfast calls, "was this what you wanted?" "are congratulations in order?" "is this it; will it work?" and "Comrade, you've really done it this time!" No, not quite I replied to all questions; this is not exactly what I advised; it may not work best this way up, except in one or two key aspects; problem being the mandarins have again been over-hesitant about timing, conditionalities, wanting more reflection for weeding out political hostages to fortune, so no precise technical details, trying to please everyone, all stakeholders, though not shareholders or bonus-earners. But, as I said to anyone who'd listen, "the action must be forthright, original, comprehensive and innovative, er... like the Irish". Some of this was reflected in PM Brown's use of these key words except the 'I' word, in this morning's No.10 press conference.
It should be noted that once the EU abandoned a collective response (the proposed €300bn emergency fund) and all countries were permitted to find their own solutions, then any EU objections to the UK's plan cannot be sustained. What's in the plan that will work or not?
1. Two tranches of £25bn standing by for banks to request capital from the government as 3yr loans vested in preference shares paying dividend and fees
2. Liquidity (SLS swaps and loans) from Bank of England increased from the £40bn (as was expected this week) to £200bn
3. Government guarantee covering £250bn of interbank lending (borrowing by UK banks). This is the part that will work best of all by reversing the risk downgrading of UK banks - and it should cost the Government nothing. Also, expect a coordinated rate cut of 50bp by US, EU, Switz, Can and UK.
4. No equivalent of TARP; no buying of toxic assets or a run-off fund into which banks can pool their low-grade RMBS and CMBS
5. Stricter and wider-ranging regulatory supervision (new rulebook from the FSA).
One signal from this is that government expects the crisis to play-out within 3 years, but will not say more than taking decisive action to protect taxpayers' interests by restructuring the banks's capital and doing so more boldly and comprehensively than most will have anticipated, but also leaving time, having anunciated the principles, for wide consultation including internationally. For example, given the global nature of the crisis a global G8-scale solution is needed.
The first measure is the Buffet-style solution with a difference that owes something to the weakness of TARP i.e. banks have to apply individually for this capital support and only then will details be determined on a case by case basis when some additional conditionalities can be imposed. It may be feared that these could seriously diminish the rights of shareholders and management board sub-committees of the applying banks re. their ALCO credit risk strategy settings, remuneration and dividends etc. But, actually not, as these aspects will be dictated in new rules from the FSA that will apply to all.
Banks will risk advertising their distress if they individually apply for capital infusion, and the government will have the right to order banks to act counter-cyclically; to maintain lending to small businesses and first-time mortgage borrowers. This may work if applied to all clearing banks uniformly, not on a case by case basis. Of course, at present, neither Bank Santander (Abbey, A&L and B&B) nor HSBC or Standard may feel that they need any help, though with EU and BRIC economies slowing and markets plummeting this may only be a matter of time - and all banks are exposed to the USA and UK recessions.
My solution would have been more shocking i.e. to take at least 25% shares in each of the UK clearing banks. This is not the Spanish flue-cleaning approach, which is itslef a good move. Madrid's Mr Zapatero, excluded from last weekend’s European summit in Paris, to keep liquidity flowing in the Spanish banking system, does not plan to take equity stakes in its banks, or dictate lending or remuneration, instead it will buy between €30-€50bn of bank assets (with funding of a similar magnitude to the US, at 5% ratio to GDP). But similarities between Mr Zapatero’s “tarpas” plan and Hank Tarpaulson’s solution end. Rather than buy “toxics”, Mr Zapatero's government will only buy “healthy” assets, i.e triple-A.
But, this would have not pleased Santander, no more than HSBC and Santander may be pleased with the UK plan, if not others. The UK plan may be very acceptable to a few like RBS and HBOS right now. Plenty of objections are available to head it off in later consultations e.g. the rights of shareholders to a vote, international codes and laws and why only the clearers and not all banks? Also, more time may be required for all of the main banks to come round and find a common front with some collective initiatives of their own?
I also advised a vehicle for stripping out banks' toxic assets. The objections to this are that most of those assets are either off-shore or in other countries, especially in the US where the local subsidiaries of UK banks can apply to TARP. The international spread of UK banks' militated against such a solution targeted on only one part of banks' balance sheets; better therefore to focus this time round only on the banks' capital restructuring needs. And, if confidence is restored, especially if shares recover, there is a possibility that the £50bn allocated will not need to be applied to, not all of it. Moreover, it was felt shares are unlikely to bounce up soon and therefore this plan announced today (following on as it does from a long series of liquidity measures, nationally and internationally) is longer term, a point repeated by PM Brown to the press.
This was quite realistic thinking, given that while the principles were finally agreed and written up for public release, Asian markets all fell by 3-4% overnight after the US markets had dropped 5% and so London was expected to follow suit today, falling across the board and down 4% before most bankers had even got to their offices. Among all FTSE100 stocks only, remarkably, HBOS was rising fast, by a spikey 22%!?

Tuesday, 7 October 2008

When good news is no news, no news is good news!


We have got used to positive news about measures to resolve systemic problems being discounted by the markets and bad news items, however trivial when seen in wide-focus resulting in market panic reactions! Tonight, in another effort to soothe concerns about banking sector losses, about bank risk ratings downgrades, and because interbank rates remain stubbornly high, PM Gordon Brown, has ordered what in UK terms is a massive taxpayer-backed cash injection to rebuild the balance sheets of UK's clearing banks, effectively part-nationalising them at a cost of undisclosed tens of £ billions. He has sanctioned public funcing to recapitalise the leading banks, to restore confidence in the system and to encourage them to start lending to each other again and so that they can borrow at lower rates, domestically and internationally.
Following announcement of the UK Government's new funds for UK banks 3 month £ LIBOR should fall though not by a significant amount, maybe 50bp, but this may point to a trend turning point presaging a 50bp bank rate cut on Monday? It will take some time before interbank rates fall significantly. Financial firms have been said by some analysts to be hoarding money to cover potential losses. It may be equally true to say that many banks have cashflow shortages. In the current hyper-sensitive climate, any warnings about liquidity and solvency, or other bearish news and rumours, can become self-fulfilling!
This week, for example, UK banks' economists predicted recession next year and the CBI next weighed in saying recession is here now? I recall the OECD forecasting 10 months ago that UK GDP will slow to 2% in 2008 from 3.1% in 2007, largely because of a weaker housing market - case of further insight into the bleeding obvious, except the growth rates were absurd and took no account of financial risks? OECD, also at that time, predicted US GDP would slow at the start of 2009! As explained before I think none of these estimates can be reliable indicators - we do not yet have reliable GDP data. Merril Lynch and Citibank in January of 2007 predicted recession this year or next. The only good thing about all such estimates is that they can be all over the place. The bad happens when some economist egos should choose these turbulent days to come out with their miserable macro-guesstimates just because they know they'll get front page headlines!

Risk Drama = romance -> tragedy/12.5 + farce*0.25 - goodwill/100



FTSE100 & THE DOW
High drama yesterday followed by a pause in Europe and USA while markets tread water by shifting into commodity stocks and watching the banks drown. Despite the $1.4tn loans plan to US banks by the Fed, investors are slow to express any enthusiasm; they may be resigned to hitting 9,000 anytime soon? Here in London, the regulators go to Downing Street to discuss the £50bn preference share investment in leading UK banks over tea ad biscuits. Announcements may be made before the US closes. Matters have come to a head following the decision by EU ministers not to wait on a €300bn bad bank fund, and instead allow each coutry to freely undertake its own saving plans.
After HSBC, the next 4 big UK banks are currently priced at roughly £50bn after HBOS roughly lost 40%, RBS 30%, Barclays 20%, Lloyds 15%. Last night Government buying preference shares (a real bailout)was discussed and junior HMT mandarins briefed the BBC saying that the banks had not asked for money though this became the rumour by the time trading started this morning and was denied by Barclays and RBS i.e. we were waving not drowning! The downgrades and threat of further risk downgrades below AA- necessary for unsecured borrowing have brought the banks to their knees.
The issues to be discussed over tea and biscuits are how to infuse banks with government convertible bonds or shareholdings without diluting existing shareholders, which is not possible unless as a direct result of the deal the banks' shares soar upwards. The dilution effect could be anything from 25% to 50%. Temporary or not the effect is that the banks will be sufficiently nationalised for the Government to dictate pro-cyclical or anti-cyclical stance of the banks as we bump along the bottom of a recession. If they take the Belgian approach to Fortis as a template Government may also seek to separate out the toxic assets into remote entities i.e. securitisation under government guarantee akin to its underwriting of interest payable on student loan company securitised loanbooks. Fortis had written down its structured credits (including US sub-prime exposures) to €43bn by June and now (crudely) wrote the lot down to €10bn (senior tranche to 25%, mezzanine and basement tranches to 10%). The running of this book is all that remains to the Fortis brand. The major UK bank brands will not be so discarded. But, if the banks can be cleaned out of their most toxic exposures (into something like Lloyds of London did with its asbestos claims runoff vehicle Equitas i the late '80s). If this is done simultaneously with UK Government buying large percentages via preferece shares, then the dilution effect on existing shareholders may be minimised.

Market screw is turned but threads are worn

While UK Gov and BoE speculate to accumulate their bank bailout options, to greelight £45bn or not, conditional on convertible terms or not, the Fed has announced a plan to buy massive amounts of short-term debts in a dramatic de-clogging effort. At US market opening the expectation is high of a rebound, and the market is ticking up.

To help ease credit stresses, the Fed announced last night it will provide as much as $900 billion in cash loans to banks. Most of the loans are for 28-days and 84-days. Some are shorter,13 and 17 day loans. The Fed said it will also buy UP TO $500bn CP (commercial paper) that many banks issue and rely on to finance their day-to-day overhead costs such as paying the electricity bill, purchasing office supplies, and even for making payrolls. Will this be seen as great news or evidence of banks having cash-flow embarassments even to the extent of not meeting all regular running costs?

Market sentiment is not helped by the less than televisual appeal of the likes of Bernanke (who trusts men in beards?) or Richard Fuld's less than saintly explanation for his reputed $600m in take-home from Lehmans since 2000 (never mind the $3.5bn in bonus fund and wages owed when Lehmans registered for Chapter 11, or the missing $4bn transferred only hours beforehand, ot the many $billions of missing from other firms' rehypothecated collateral? - see crunch imagery blog)

IMF - another solution?

The FT carries an article proposing an IMF role. The IMF's reputation was established in the post WWII decades in recycling currency surpluses and helping to shore up exchange rates under pressure from Governments' fiscal stances. Insofar as the present crisis was caused by extreme trade imbalances and a few credit boom economies' large deficits versus rest of the world's trade surpluses, which were then balanced largely by securitised financial assets, perhaps a renewed role for the IMF is intuitively practical? But acting at the micro-economic level to save banks is very different from the macro-economic righting of global imbalances.
Banks have liquidity and solvency problems. The latter include replenishing their own capital reserves and the former requires more willing and cheaper recycling of money between all banks. But, there is too a third Machiavellian dimension that of banks jockeying to win bigger shares of financial makets as some go under and others are taken over.
There can be little doubt about the Machiavellian aspect - no more than we doubt the role of short sellers (hedge funds, who even now are lobbying officially to resume short-selling!) Banks with substantial emerging markets exposure (such as HSBC, Standard and Santander) and those working closely with central banks (such as JPM, BA, and BNPP) are big gainers from M&A consolidations (and without paying M&A fees!) But, if the quake has more after-shocks, it may need sticks (or crowbars)not carrots to free up interbank liquidity. Could this mean governments and central banks ordering banks to act systemically, and stop acting selfishly, or they risk a public sector Buffet solution a la Fortis - even if this is the prospect driving down banks' shares today. What could the beneficial role of the IMF be (or BIS too)? Banks certainly need to replenish their capital to cover writedowns, actual losses and falling equity capital.
How the IMF might be more effective than cooperation among central banks that are backed by government treasuries is hard to plumb precisely from Raghuram Rajan's essay in the FT. IMF has experience in managing large funds (contributed by many governments) and drawing rights, but not private finance sources or even sovereign funds, which is more the World Bank style. Would the IMF be backed to issue $ trillions of international government bonds? Would there be political conditions such as hobbled TARP, or other restrictions such as central banks accepting only triple-A collateral and the minimum risk grade of AA- for unsecured interbank lending? Yes, liquidity and capital raising are the issues, but as fast as these are be shored up temporarily gains are lost in bank equity falls. Few disagree that banks' shares are over-sold or toxic assets have more value long term than their current prices. The biggest problem, however, is lost confidence in banks generally that money alone may not recover?
The banks have to get together and mutually resolve their shared systemic problems that most observers believe are the banks' own fault. If banks are the architects of their failed models they must agree new ones or revive older proven ones, but at very least show confidence in each other. Until they can be seen to be successfully doing that and reducing dependence on government help why should confidence in the financial system return? Does the IMF or anyone else have the answers to that? It seems to me that the banks are failing through their associations or any other fora to get together and come up with workable answers for what we used to refer to as "good governance in correspondent banking". For now it is a dog eat dog world. Indeed yesterday, we also learned that that one quarter to one third of the world's animal species are at risk of extiction within decades and how even more serious this is than the financial crisis. There may be a few species of bankers that the public would not miss, but if such species extinctions happen the long term outlook will be insects growing their share of animal biomass by weight from 90% to 93%, and already I've noticed growth in the number of companies trying to sell me trading software packages, household debt management, new kitchens and the usual extensions!

Monday, 6 October 2008

Big Banks OK? - None too big to fail?! Er, No?!


When markets move in an hour or a day up or down by percentages normally experienced over many months you know you're lost, VaR and volatility risk models useless, broken. For a decade, anytime walking past the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street or the Stock Exchange I'd regret the loss of their powers over the rest of The City. No longer. Not since 1926 when 200 British banks failed, has the Bank of England's role been more critical.
This morning RBS is -31%, Barclays -13% and Lloyds -12%. Barclays opened at -15% and Lloyds -20%, based on speculation that the government is considering the Warren Buffet solution of injecting capital into banks in return for equity stakes and so this is being rumoured as massive rights issue dilutions. The rule is "buy on fact, sell on rumour!" (Barclays are anxiously denying the rumour that it has asked UK Government for financial support - which kills the TARP idea and leaves us with the Buffett profit-way!) So everyone's selling until after lunch maybe? (And hedge funds are all straining at their leashes; amazingly they are officially complaining to Government to be allowed to resume short-selling, complaining the options market is too expensive!)
Backed by UK Government and other EU governments saying that from now on no big bank must be allowed to fail. This brave stance is being tested to destruction (markets do that). More than that, the game is now to save countries' financial sectors, perhaps even beginning with the UK - why not, since the £ is going down. It is a battle of wills, hard cash and ideologies; if banks cannot save themselves and in the global scale of the present turbulence, it does not seem at all impossible for the UK big 4/5 banks to be taken into majority public ownership, or at least one third?
What is the global scale against which this may become a puny if necessary and desperate decision? Yesterday saw sell-offs led by recession fears; today the sell-offs are led by banks. Now, the very biggest UK banks are at imminent risk, and others in Europe. Yesterday world equity stocks lost about $2tn (equal to half of all banks' tier 1 capital), of which US $0.5tn (after falling $1tn and then recovering half of this in the last hour), UK lost $0.1tn, Rest of Europe $0.2tn, Japan $0.15tn (and the same again in the first 15 minutes on Tokyo's opening this morning) and so on, and probably the same again today, why not? All told about $8tn has evaporated (-14%) from the world's stock markets since last Christmas, a quarter of that yesterday alone, but it might be $10tn by tonight, and then again it could be bounce up tomorrow or just down then up each day until we stop playing markets at the weekend when the central bankers and big banks get together to decide how to save this or that systemically big bank, and maybe this weekend there will be half a dozen major banks' balance sheets on the operating table? This is high finance high politics - nerve-wracking and ruthless.(Fortis was sold for €14.5bn well below book value its and minus its toxic assets also written down from €44bn to €10bn!).
Stock market investors and brokers are very febrile, jaded, cynical, no wonder, reacting instantly to every cage-rattle, win some lose some but keep on trading until maybe even big countries follow Iceland's example and stop the trading in banks' shares? The $ is going up and funds are flowing from Europe to the USA.
Slower moving events have comparable scale. Residential and commercial real estate values have retreated globally by roughly $8tn also. World cash earnings and profits (GDP) growth has slowed by maybe $2.5tn if growth is still positive for the year which seems unlikely? US and UK and other Anglo-saxon economies are in recession already. It may take months yet before official figures confirm this. But, adding in debt market write-downs it is not hard to conclude that about $15tn of active credit collateral supporting secured and unsecured bank lending has gone, and will not return for some time, not for 2-3 years.
I estimate that the world's banks have about $100tn in assets (loans) outstanding originally secured by about $60tn of financial assets and property values (including RMBS and CMBS etc.) the prices of which have fallen by maybe one third. The world's banks (financial system) have about $60tn in private and business deposits and bank bonds' holders. There remains $70tn in property and about $40tn in equities, $10tn in government bonds plus maybe $6tn non-junk corporate bonds. If 10% of all these convert to new bank collateral (only $8tn), which would be a stunning result, then on top of about $0.5tn in lost equity, the banks need to find another $1tn in new capital. But, most of this need is concentrated in USA and Europe. The banks need to replenish about one third of their "own capital" and that therefore is the % of banks that governments are looking at ending up owning. The equity markets are roughly discounting that possibility already by knocking banks' shares down by a third over 2 days!